Rewiev of Amir, L. (2014). Humor and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard. Albany: State University of New York Press.

_An exploration of philosophical and religious ideas about humor in modern philosophy and their secular implications._.

In this paper I am concerned with two questions: What is sexist humor? and what is wrong with it? To answer the first question, I briefly develop a theory of humor and then characterize sexist humor as humor in which sexist beliefs are presupposed and are necessary to the fun. Concerning the second question, I criticize a common sort of argument that is supposed to explain why sexist humor is offensive: although the argument explains why sexist humor feels offensive, it (...) does not place responsibility for the offense in the humorist or audience that enjoys sexist humor. I develop an alternate account of the offense in sexist humor that places responsibility for offense in precisely those quarters. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests that ?A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes?. The idea for this dialogue comes from a conversation that Michael Peters and Morwenna Griffiths had at the Philosophy of Education of Great Britain annual meeting at the University of Oxford, 2011. It was sparked by an account of an assessment of a piece of work where one of the external examiners unexpectedly exclaimed ?I knew Jean-Paul Sartre?, trying to trump the discussion. This (...) conversation is a dialogue about comedy and humor as a basis for philosophy, education and pedagogy that provides an introduction to recent works and a context for ongoing research. The concluding section provides further reflection on some of the main themes, drawing attention to the significance of humor in dialogues within philosophy and education, and suggesting that it has a particular role in resisting managerialism at all levels of educational institutions. (shrink)

Destaco algunas de las aportaciones de autores contemporáneos que han abordado el tema del humor desde un punto de vista ético, principalmente: Ronald de Sousa, Joseph Boskin, John Morreall, Simon Critchley y Vittorio Hösle. Partiendo de su pensamiento, defiendo que la «ética del humor» tiene, al menos, las siguientes características: nos ayuda a reconocer los valores éticos en los que realmente creemos, detecta el humor éticamente incorrecto que mantiene estereotipos, fomenta el desarrollo de virtudes, critica los vicios de la sociedad (...) contribuyendo a construir una sociedad más ética, y justifica con razones adecuadas la risa que trata de mejorar éticamente a la sociedad. I emphasize some of the contributions of contemporary authors that deal with the issue of humor from an ethical perspective, mainly: Ronald de Sousa, Joseph Boskin, John Morreall, Simon Critchley and Vittorio Hösle. Starting from their thoughts I defend that the «ethics of humor» has, at least, the following features: it helps us to recognize the ethical values in which we really believe, it detects the ethically incorrect humor that maintains stereotypes, it promotes the development of virtues, it criticize the vices of the society contributing to build a more ethical society, and justifies with adequate reasons the laughing that tries to improve ethically our society. (shrink)

Humor is a surprisingly understudied topic in philosophy. However, there has been a flurry of interest in the subject over the past few decades. This article outlines the major theories of humor. It argues for the need for more publications on humor by philosophers. More specifically, it suggests that humor may not be a well-understood phenomenon by questioning a widespread consensus in recent publications – namely, that humor can be detached from laughter. It is argued that this consensus relies on (...) a cognitivist account of emotion, one that is open to debate, and that it becomes unclear what sorts of phenomena a theory of humor is supposed to explain when one questions this assumption. (shrink)

In this thesis, I address the metaphysical question `What is humour?' and the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' Consulting a dictionary reveals a circle of definitions between `amusement', `funniness', and `humour'. So I split the metaphysical question `What is humour?' into three questions: `What is amusement?', `What is funniness?' and `What is humour?' By critically analysing then synthesising recent research in philosophy, psychology and linguistics, I give the following answers: x amuses y if and only if: y is in (...) a non-serious, non-threatened, non-goal-directed state. y simultaneously activates two incompatible interpretations of x via unsound logic. sufficiently increases the psychological arousal of y. x is funny if and only if x merits amusement. x is humour if and only if the function of x is to merit or elicit amusement. Similarly, I split the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' into three questions: `When is amusement immoral?', `How does immorality affect funniness?' and `When is humour immoral?' By using, and, I give the following answers: Amusement is immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines, or to be immoral. Immorality negatively affects funniness. Humour-types are not subject to moral evaluation. Humour-tokens are immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines them to be immoral. This thesis contributes to the knowledge of the subject in two ways. First, by critically analysing and synthesising recent inter-disciplinary research, provides a more precisely specified definition of amusement than that in the philosophical literature. Second, research on humour, across all disciplines, conflates the three closely related but distinct concepts of humour, amusement and funniness. By providing a linear sequence of definitions,, and avoid the conceptual confusions that commonly occur. (shrink)

To what extent can humorism be a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd? The Absurd is born from the insurmountable contradiction between one’s ceaseless striving and the absence of an ultimate resolution – or, as I prefer to call it, the ‘dissolution of resolution’. Humoristic Absurdism is the commitment to a pattern of humorous responses to the Absurd, which regard this absurd condition, as well as its manifestation in absurd situations, as a comical phenomenon. Although the humoristic disposition seems promising, by (...) virtue of humor’s recognition of incongruity and its denial of an ultimate resolution, and succeeds in countering three major objections, it falls prey to the claim that comprehensive humorism portrays as frivolous what is earnest, thereby renouncing the gravity of the desire for ultimate resolution, which is fundamental to the notion of the Absurd. In an attempt to explore alternative roles for humor in a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd, Metamodern Absurdism is suggested, which revolves around a post-ironic oscillation between humor and earnestness. In short, only in a role limited to one pole of an oscillatory pattern of responses can humor be integrated in a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd. (shrink)

Previous research has noted the ambiguous persuasive potentials of reiteration: repeating a statement, slogan or image can work both positively and negatively, can both help and hinder the effectiveness of a political message. Considering that repeated propaganda in China is broadly ineffective in generating wholehearted public support, this article is interested in how and when repetition does achieve meaningful persuasion. Drawing on affect theory to address these multiple potentials, it critically reconsiders the nature of persuasion itself, arguing that affective engagement (...) is crucial in sustaining and consolidating temporary tendencies that lead to alteration in the social fabric. Looking at humorous ‘socialist memes’ popularised on the Chinese internet in recent years, the article conducts a discourse analysis on the patterns they reveal to break down this reiterative practice as an unfolding event, revealing how its humour disrupts official language and engages the public affectively. It argues that practice of repeating these memes produces interpretive ambiguities around the official language, and in doing so re-directs socialist persuasion towards a liberalised end. (shrink)

En este artículo presento, clarifico y exploro algunas virtudes potenciales de una determinada teoría —de carácter intencionalista— sobre lo cómico. Su tesis mínima principal establece una condición necesaria para la comicidad: quien evalúaaprecia una situación como humorística/cómica reconoce un perjuicio o daño ocasionado a ciertos sujetos intencionales. Una versión más fuerte establece que la comicidad deriva de dicho perjuicio. El perjuicio es aquello que, cuando se combina con otros factores, encontramos humorístico/cómico. Clarificar la teoría conlleva una tarea de comparación con (...) otras concepciones del humor, en particular, con la teoría de la incongruencia. (shrink)