Peter Strawson holds that on a proper conception of personhood, the problem of Other Minds does not arise. I suggest that the viability of his proposal depends on a particular account of person perception. I argue that neither the theory theory nor the simulation theory of mindreading constitutes a suitable basis for this account. I then go on to defend Peter Hobson's notion of 'feeling perception' as an intersubjectivist alternative that, if properly developed, delivers a basis for a viable account (...) of person perception. In developing that alternative, I draw on John Campbell's suggestion that self-understanding is constituted, in part, by an understanding of oneself as a cause of many events. (shrink)

Ever since Freud pioneered the “talking cure,” psychologists of various stripes have explored how autobiographical narrative bears on self-understanding and psychic wellbeing. Recently, there has been a wave of philosophical speculation as to whether autobiographical narrative plays an essential or important role in the constitution of agentic selves. However, embodiment has received little attention from philosophers who defend some version of the narrative self. Catriona Mackenzie is an important exception to this pattern of neglect, and this paper explores Mackenzie’s work (...) on embodiment and self-narrative with the aim of better understanding the adequacy of autobiographical narrative as an account of the agentic self. I argue that Mackenzie’s narrative account of embodied subjectivity and agency is incomplete, for it over-estimates the reach of narrative and underestimates the cognitive and agentic powers of the lived body. (shrink)

Recent debates in the philosophy of dance have focused on the relationship between motor response and dance appreciation. Some philosophers argue that motor responses to dances are an important part of dance appreciation. Proponents of such a claim are often backed with support from cognitive science. But it has not remained uncontroversial. Despite its controversy, the concept of motor response remains under-analyzed. As a result, assumptions about the idea and purpose of motor response get borrowed from cognitive science. I argue (...) that one such assumption, that motor response is supposed to be veridical, runs us into several problems. It runs us into something of a paradox, where it is claimed that motor responses happen as part of our general perception of movement. However, few people experience such responses. Furthermore, it seems that the motor responses that are appropriate for a dance might not be the ones the dancer is feeling. As a result, we should prefer an account of motor response that emphasizes its flexibility and its ability to change and adapt to the movement we see. (shrink)