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Some myths about 'mental illness'

Michael S. Moore

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):233 – 265 (1975)

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II. The concept of mental illness: Working through the myths.David Michael Levin - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):360-365.details In ?Some Myths about ?Mental Illness'? (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 3), Michael Moore attempts to clarify and refute what he takes to be the radical (existential) position concerning the nature and diagnosis of mental illness. Moore's dissatisfaction with certain formulations and conceptualizations of the radical position is endorsed; as also the need to introduce greater rigor and precision into the discussion of mental illness. But Moore's clarifications are really misunderstandings and, in consequence, his refutations do not succeed. Moore's five?fold (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)The insanity plea: Szaszian ethics and epistemology.Lee S. Weinberg & Richard E. Vatz - 1982 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (3):417-433.details The traditional legal verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as well as the more recent verdict of guilty but mentally ill rest on often unquestioned epistemological assumptions about human behavior and its causes, unjustified reliance on forensic psychiatrists, and questionable, if not deplorable ethical standards. This paper offers a critique of legal perspectives on insanity, historical and current, based on the altermative epistemological and ethical assumptions of Thomas S. Szasz. In addition, we examine Szasz''s unique rhetorical analysis of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Reality of Mental Illness.T. S. Champlin - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (218):467 - 487.details My three main points are: Mental disease is a metaphor, but mental illness is not. Feeling ill and having a physical illness are logically related. If there were no such thing as feeling ill, there would be no such thing as suffering from a physical illness. Yet there is no logical connection between feeling ill and being mentally ill. Mental illness is manifested in various forms of behaviour, for example, suspiciousness, elation, depression, etc.; if a form of behaviour is to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Mental illness: psychiatry's phlogiston.Thomas Szasz - 2001 - Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (5):297-301.details In physics, we use the same laws to explain why airplanes fly, and why they crash. In psychiatry, we use one set of laws to explain sane behaviour, which we attribute to reasons (choices), and another set of laws to explain insane behaviour, which we attribute to causes (diseases). God, man's idea of moral perfection, judges human deeds without distinguishing between sane persons responsible for their behaviour and insane persons deserving to be excused for their evil deeds. It is hubris (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Objectivity of the Concepts of Health and Disease.Paul Thompson - 1991 - Analyse & Kritik 13 (1):94-100.details It is now widely accepted that the concepts of “health” and “disease” in psychiatric and psychological contexts are value laden. In this article I argue that even in the realm of physical illness and disease (appendicitis, phenylketonuria, etc.), the concepts of “health”, “illness” and "disease” are value laden. I explore the four most common bases used to objectively ground the key concept “normal functioning”, namely, genetic structure, evolutionary fitness, non-premature death and absence of pain. I argue that they all fail (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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