Dans cet article, l’objectif est de montrer que l’acceptation politique et sociale des mécanismes d’appariement pour les reins mis au point par Roth, Ünver et Sönmez nous fournit de quoi comprendre le rejet de la logique marchande dans le cadre de certains biens. Nous nous pencherons particulièrement sur trois explications généralement convoquer pour expliquer ce rejet : (I) le caractère corrupteur de la monnaie, (II) l’idée selon laquelle le marché en tant que tel devrait être rejeté, et (III) l’hypothèse selon (...) laquelle le rejet du marché reposerait avant tout sur le fait que ce dernier engendrerait un rapport de domination entre l’offreur et le demandeur. Par le biais d’une analyse comparative entre les propositions de marchés aux organes (rejetées dans la plupart des pays) et les systèmes d’appariement proposés par Roth, Ünver et Sönmez (2004, 2005, 2007) - mis en place dans un grand nombre de pays - nous nuancerons ces explications au profit d’une quatrième : le marché aux organes est rejeté non pas parce qu’il génère de la domination, mais parce qu’il présuppose la vulnérabilité des offreurs potentiels : sans vulnérabilité, pas de marchés d’organes. (shrink)

Background Advocates for a regulated system to facilitate kidney donation between unrelated donor-recipient pairs argue that monetary compensation encourages people to donate vital organs that save the lives of patients with end-stage organ failure. Scholars support compensating donors as a form of reciprocity. This study aims to assess the compensation system for the unrelated kidney donation program in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a particular focus on the implications of Islam on organ donation and organ sales. Methods This study (...) reviews secondary documents for philosophical argumentation and ethical analysis of human organ donation and sale for transplantation. Results and discussion According to Islamic law, organ donation is an act of _sadaqatul jariyah,_ and individuals are permitted to donate organs with the intention of saving lives. The commercialization of humans as organ sellers and buyers is contrary to the Islamic legal maxim _eethaar_, undermining donors of ‘selfless’ or ‘altruistic’ motivations. Such an act should be considered immoral, and the practice should not be introduced into other countries for the sake of protecting human dignity, integrity, solidarity, and respect. I, therefore, argue that Iran’s unrelated kidney donation program not only disregards the position of the Islamic religion with respect to the provision or receipt of monetary benefits for human kidneys for transplantation but that it also misinterprets the Islamic legal proscription of the sale of human organs. I also argue that the implementation of Iran’s unrelated kidney donor transplantation program is unethical and immoral in that potential donors and recipients engage in a bargaining process akin to that which sellers and buyers regularly face in regulated commodity exchange markets. Conversely, I suggest that a modest fixed monetary remuneration as a gift be provided to a donor as a reward for their altruistic organ donation, which is permissible by Islamic scholars. This may remove the need to bargain for increased or decreased values of payment in exchange for the organ, as well as the transactional nature of ‘buyer and seller’, ensuring the philosophy of ‘donor and recipient’ is maintained. Conclusions Offering a fixed modest monetary incentive to organ donors would serve to increase organ supply while protecting donors’ health and reducing human suffering without legalizing the human organ trade. (shrink)

Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in some form of Kant’s moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant’s approach to law in his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant’s political philosophy requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant’s approach to laws, such as those governing kidney distribution, was formed (...) in part by considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The author explains some of Kant’s reasons for rejecting this assumption and concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable. (shrink)

An innovative program recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles Medical Center allows people to donate a kidney in exchange for a voucher that a loved one can redeem for a kidney if and when needed. As a relatively new practice, the ethical implications of advanced kidney donation have not yet been widely discussed. This paper reflects on some of the bioethical issues at stake in this new donation program, as well as some broader philosophical issues related to (...) the meaning and moral salience of commodification. I first consider whether the literature on commercial markets in organs––a longstanding topic of bioethical debate––can meaningfully inform ethical analysis of kidney voucher programs. Specifically, I consider whether and to what extent common objections to the exchange of kidneys for cash also apply to the exchange of kidneys for “kidney vouchers.” Second, I argue that the contrast between the ethical issues raised by these two practices highlights the need to understand commodification as existing on a continuum, with different degrees of commodification giving rise to different ethical issues. Doing so can help sharpen our understanding of commodification as a moral concept, as well as its relevance to broader debates about the moral limits of markets. (shrink)

Referring to Kant’s arguments addressing the moral relationship between our bodies and ourselves is quite common in contemporary debate about organ selling, although he does not provide us with any specific arguments related to this debate. It is widely argued that the most promising way to show the moral impermissibility of organ selling is to mount an argument on Kantian grounds. This paper asks whether it is possible to argue coherently against organ selling in a Kantian framework. It will be (...) shown that by mounting the argument on Kantian grounds no compelling argument can be given against sale of organs, either because the arguments apply to donation of organs, too, or the arguments are not convincing for other independent reasons. In the first section, it will be argued that donation and selling are not distinguishable in a Kantian framework, since the concern about commodification of the body and its parts shall be raised by both actions. In the second section, some contemporary accounts inspired by Kant will be presented and discussed separately. It will be argued that the reasons for promoting organ donation while arguing against selling clash with each other in an unconvincing way. -/- More Info: DOI: 10.1007/s11019-015-9623-z. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence in medicine, economics, law, and anthropology, I argue that a market is uniquely capable of meeting the demand for transplantable kidneys, and that it may be arranged so as to operate safely. The welfare gains, expected to accrue to both vendors and recipients, are sufficient to justify sales. Having spelled out the considerations recommending a kidney market, I address the most forceful objections facing the proposal. Despite its currency, the claim that incentives will crowd out altruistic (...) donors and result in a decrease in supply is empirically unsupported and predicated on an implausible view of donorsâ motives. A host of objections claim vendorsâ will not give informed consent. Many such objections identify easily remediable problems, or impose unreasonable standards â standards that would rule out morally permissible kidney donation. And all presuppose a model of morally transformative consent that, I argue, is deficient. Two further challenges point to harms inflicted on those who do not participate in the market. Some claim that those in poverty will be subject to harmful social and legal pressure to vend. This objection fails to distinguish between being pressured to perform a specific act, and being under general economic pressure and having the option to perform an act. It, moreover, presupposes vending more common than is possible. Others worry that the market will give rise to unfair pecuniary externalities. This objection also presupposes that kidney sales will occur more often than is possible. But more importantly, the normative consideration that is supposed to make such externalities especially objectionable, in fact, recommends allowing sales. I also make a political case for kidney sales. I offer an account of the stateâs proper role in the market. I begin with a conception of democratic equality according to which the state is responsible to secure for its citizens the preconditions for democratic participation. I then show that this end would be promoted were the state to end the current prohibition on sales. (shrink)

Has not the time fully come to lift the prohibition on a regulated market in organs for transplantation? Is there a price for such a market that would be too high to pay? The author revisits the cases for and against organ markets in the light of cultural shifts in society and asks whether the traditional insistence on altruism represents a hindrance to much needed developments or a safeguard for much valued public goods.

Shortages in the number of donated organs after death and the growing number of end-stage organ failure patients on waiting lists call for looking at alternatives to increase the number of organs that could be used for transplantation purposes. One option that has led to a legal and ethical debate is to have regulated markets in human organs. Opponents of a market in human organs offer different arguments that are mostly founded on contingent factors that can be adjusted. However, some (...) authors have asked the question whether we still have a reason to believe that there is something wrong with offering human organs for sale for transplantation purposes, even if the circumstances under which the practice takes place are improved. One prominent argument regarding this appeals to the notion of human dignity. It is argued that organ selling violates human dignity. This paper presents a systematic discussion of dignity-based arguments in the organ selling debate, and then develops a social account of dignity. It is argued that allowing the practice of organ selling inherently runs the risk of promoting the notion that some persons have less worth than others and that persons have a price, which is incompatible with dignity. The approach is defended against possible objections and it is shown that it can capture the notion that autonomy is linked to human dignity in important ways, while dignity at the same time can constrain the autonomous choices of persons with regards to certain practices. (shrink)

In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions (...) across several registers of moral analysis. Second, I formulate what I consider the most illuminating questions regarding the criteria used to evaluate commodification in law. Critiques of commodification in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hyperbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the law and economics movement. (shrink)

In his article "Markets and the Needy: Organ Sales or Aid?" T. L. Zutlevics briefly touches upon the conceptual link between the practice of living1 suppliers2 selling their kidneys and prostitutes selling sexual services. In an attempt to defuse Gerald Dworkin's (Dworkin 1993) appeals to autonomy that undergird his justification of establishing a controlled market in transplantable organs from living suppliers, Zutlevics writes:Whilst initially appealing, this argument is problematic in that it justifies a great deal more than allowing the poor (...) to sell their organs. The situations of the poor can be so desperate that even actions which cause extreme harm would constitute an improvement in their situation. . . . .. (shrink)

Recent scholarship suggests that the practices of selling sex and selling kidneys can be understood as examples of serious harms that are sometimes chosen by autonomous individuals who find themselves in difficult straits. This analogy between kidney sales by live suppliers and prostitution deserves careful, rigorous consideration. Ideas about autonomy, paternalism, systemic oppression, commodification, and the human body are at the core of each controversy. This paper seeks to use the well-developed, radical feminist literature opposing prostitution and critiquing the liberal (...) tradition’s account of autonomy to explain why the sale of kidneys by live suppliers should continue to be prohibited in the United States. (shrink)