On ‘caritas’ and the promise of ‘right intent’ Back to the roots of justice in war In classical Just War texts, the criterion of ‘right intent’ is considered a key concept with regard to the justice of a war as such, since it refers to the basic iustus disposition from which the other criteria (ad bellum as well as in bello and post bellum) should be applied. However, in current JW debates, determined to a large extent by Traditionalists and Revisionists, (...) the importance of this key concept threatens to disappear from view. This article aims to show the relevance of further reflection on the role and meaning of the criterion of ‘right intent’ using classical JW insights and in particular Hannah Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s concept of ‘caritas’, given the political relevance of this concept as pointed out by Arendt. The criterion of ‘right intent’ is closely connected to Arendt’s distinction between power and violence and her principle of the right to have rights. Right intent, as a virtue, based on and inspired by caritas, in more contemporary discourse, a humanitarian ethos, implies the promise of the iustus application of the JW criteria that were originally formulated precisely for that reason. (shrink)

How do civilians react to being harmed in war? Existing studies argue that civilian casualties are strategically costly because civilian populations punish a belligerent who kills civilians and support the latter's opponent. Relying on eighty-seven semi-structured interviews with victims of coalition attacks in Afghanistan, this article shows that moral principles inform civilians’ attitudes toward their own harming. Their attitudes may therefore vary with the perceived circumstances of an attack. Civilians’ perception of harm as unintended and necessary, in accordance with the (...) moral principles of distinction and necessity, was associated with narratives that cast an attack as relatively more legitimate and with a partial or full release of the coalition from blame. The principle of proportionality, which requires that civilian casualties are caused in pursuit of a legitimate war aim, informed their abstract attitudes toward civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Two rules of international law, which accord with the moral principles of distinction and necessity, were reflected in the civilians’ attitudes. The legal rule of proportionality, which diverges from the namesake moral principle, failed to resonate with the civilians. The article explores whether compliance with the legal rules of distinction and necessity can contribute to mitigating the strategic costs of civilian casualties. (shrink)