Deleuze's interpretation of Spinozan philosophy is intrinsically related to the concept of intensity. Attributes are defined as intensive qualities, modal essences as intensive quantities or degrees of power; the life of affects corresponds to continuous variations in intensity. This essay will show why Deleuze needs the concept of intensity for his reading of Spinozan philosophy as a philosophy of expressive immanence. It will also discuss the problems that spring from this reading: in what way, if any, are modal essences modified (...) by the intensive variations of affects? How can the Spinozan conception of eternal modal essences be reconciled with the idea of affections of essence? What is the ethical import of the life of existing modes, when modal essences are considered as eternal? While these questions, in particular the last two, confront each commentator on Spinoza and demand a solution in one way or another, the essay will conclude with a question which is posed from an exclusively Deleuzian perspective: why is the concept of the virtual, which takes centre stage in Deleuze's own philosophy of immanence, missing in his account of Spinoza? (shrink)

This article focuses on three of the affects discussed in Spinoza’s Ethics: pride, esteem, and scorn. At first, it focuses mainly on the delusional aspect Spinoza attributes to these passions as a matter of definition, emphasizing the monological and self-referential dimension in which they seem to imprison the subject. It then analyzes the reference to a notion of justice contained in their definitions, and how this triggers a struggle for recognition. In a third moment, it highlights the political efficacy of (...) these affects in producing not only conflict but also social bonds. Finally, it concludes by considering how Spinoza’s treatment of these affects fits within the framework of the more general problem of the relationship between passion and reason. (shrink)

Na carta 12 de sua correspondência, Spinoza expõe sua con-cepção do infinito atual. Nesse contexto, ele desenvolve certos aspectos de sua ontologia de imanência, assim como o significado que para ele possuem os conceitos de eternidade, duração e tempo. Este texto tor-na-se então central para qualquer estudioso da questão da temporalidade em Spinoza. Nosso autor distancia-se da perspectiva cartesiana que, na mesma questão, expôs —não sem críticas— nos Princípios da Filosofia Cartesiana e nos Pensamentos Metafísicos, ambos publicados em 1663. Neste (...) artigo nos propomos estudar a distinção entre duração e tempo, para sublinhar a perspectiva propriamente spinozista da carta 12, e assim mostrar o significado que para Spinoza esses conceitos possuem no con-texto de uma discussão científica sobre o infinito atual. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza's notions of “conatus” and “power of acting” are derived by means of generalization from the notions of “force of motion” and “force of determination” that Spinoza discussed in his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy to account for interactions among bodies on the basis of their degrees of contrariety. I argue that in the Ethics, Spinoza's ontology entails that interactions must always be accounted for in terms of degrees of “agreement or disagreement in nature” among interacting things. (...) The notion of “power of acting” is used to express the extent to which a thing's conatus is aided or restrained by external causes on the basis of its degree of agreement or disagreement in nature with them. “Power of acting” generalizes the same approach and method of resolution at the basis of the notion of “force of determination” in order to account for causal interactions not only among the simplest bodies but also among more complex individuals. (shrink)

This paper aims at reconstructing the ethical issues raised by Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Specifically, I argue that Spinoza takes issue with Descartes’ epistemology in order to support a form of “ethical intellectualism” in which knowledge is envisaged as both necessary and sufficient to reach the supreme good. First, I reconstruct how Descartes exploits the distinction between truth and certainty in his Discourse on the Method. On the one hand, this distinction acts as the basis (...) for Descartes’ epistemological rules while, on the other hand, it implies a “morale par provision” in which adequate knowledge is not strictly necessary to practice virtue. Second, I show that Spinoza rejects the distinction between truth and certainty and thus the methodological doubt. This move leads Spinoza to substitute the Cartesian Cogito with the idea of God as the only adequate standard of knowledge, through which the mind can attain the rules to reach the supreme good. Third, I demonstrate that in the Short Treatise Spinoza develops this view by equating intellect and will and thus maintaining that only adequate knowledge can help to contrast affects. However, I also insist that Spinoza's early epistemology is unable to explain why human beings drop conceive of the idea of God inadequately. Thus, I suggest that in his later writings Spinoza accounts for the insufficiency of adequate knowledge in opposing the power of the imagination and passions by reconnecting the nature of ideas with the mind's conatus. (shrink)

In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-durational causation generates a puzzle, however: if no enduring thing – not even the sempiternal, indefinite individual (...) composed of all finite, enduring things – is caused by the infinite, eternal substance, then how can Spinoza consistently hold that the one infinite, eternal substance is the cause of all things and that all things are modes of that substance? At the end of this essay, I sketch how Spinoza could deny eternal-durational causation while still holding that an infinite, eternal God is the cause of all things and that all things are modes. I develop the interpretation more in the companion essay.1 1 In “Spinoza’s Monism II,” in the next issue of this journal. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reading of Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the mind in light of his theory of essence and existence. Opposing in particular recent Platonist readings of this theory, rejecting the dichotomy between formal essence and actual essence, upon which they mostly rely, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of the eternity of the mind must be grasped in terms of different aspects of one and the same existence. I moreover suggest that, for Spinoza, the mind (...) was both sempiternal and eternal, without, however, those two aspects of the mind’s existence being identical. (shrink)

This paper explores a methodological lineage among French Spinoza scholars which can be traced back to texts written by Victor Delbos (1862–1916), which later branched out into two diametrically opposed orientations in the work by Martial Gueroult (1891–1976) and Paul Vernière (1916–1997), only to be reunited reflexively in the more recent work by Pierre-François Moreau (1948-). The aim is mostly to offer an original reconstruction of the way in which Delbos’ historical programme was inherited by subsequent Spinoza scholars. While retracing (...) this lineage, my focus will be on a specific historiographical principle first formulated by Delbos. In the conclusion, however, I briefly turn to Spinoza himself, arguing how this reconstituted family of twentieth century French historians of philosophy can be characterized as a form of ‘Historiographical Spinozism’. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é exibir uma via pela qual a mente humana pode alcançar uma perspectiva eterna da natureza. Espinosa expôs a possibilidade de nossa mente compreender a essência dos corpos sob uma perspectiva eterna, que não está relacionada com a existência atual e presente dos corpos. Neste sentido, pretendo mostrar a importância em direcionarmos nosso entendimento à busca de uma via que supere o ponto de vista da duração, tão fundamental para a realização do verdadeiro conhecimento da Natureza. (...) Conhecimento que exigirá algo mais do que interpretações, significantes e significados. No Tratado Teológico-Político, notamos que nossa mente, só pelo fato de conter em si, objetivamente, “a natureza de Deus e dela participar, tem o poder de formar certas noções que explicam a natureza das coisas”. Se quisermos, realmente, entender a Natureza, precisamos nos considerar de maneira interna, e não externa a ela. Mostraremos que apenas através de uma análise não antropocêntrica dos gêneros do conhecimento de Espinosa podemos vislumbrar a conciliação entre a essência da Substância e a essência do modo e, assim, participar adequadamente da Natureza. “Por fim, vemos também que o raciocínio não é o mais importante em nós, mas somente como uma escada que nos permite nos elevarmos ao lugar almejado”. (shrink)

Spinoza está lejos del llamado pensamiento narrativo y prefiere el conocimiento atemporal de la razón. Sin embargo, la complejidad de la vida humana requiere otras formas de aproximación que permitan entenderla en su particular y a menudo contingente contexto desde el punto de vista del sujeto. Por todo ello, el autor permite -aunque sea en segundo plano- un tratamiento flexible de los asuntos prácticos, lo que incluye diversos aspectos narrativos que preparan y extienden la racionalidad. Tal es el caso del (...) estudio genealógico de los fenómenos, el debate político, los aprendizajes derivados de la experiencia, la educación, la biografía psicofísica, el uso de técnicas de sugestión y visualización, etc. Una vez más, se trata de sumar herramientas que permitan desarrollar una vida lúcida y dichosa. (shrink)

In the lecture of December 16, 1980, Deleuze proposes a cross-reading of Spinoza and Rousseau. First, Deleuze reinterprets Rousseau’s morality in the light of Spinoza’s critique of ‘morality’ based on the opposition of good and evil; second, and reciprocally, he rereads Spinoza’s practical and ethical philosophy from a concept extracted from Rousseau’s work: that of the ‘materialism of the wise’. According to Deleuze, this ‘practical materialism’ evoked by Rousseau, consisting of both ‘determinism’ and ‘sensualism’, has a Spinozist inspiration, insofar as (...) it has an amoralist dimension, close to the critique of morality developed in the Ethics. But on the other hand, Rousseau’s ‘materialism of the wise’ allows us, conversely, to reread the Spinozist explanation of the conquest of freedom, by revealing the presence of practical principles very close to those of Rousseau’s ethical materialism. The cross-reading of Spinoza and Rousseau thus presents a double aim: on the one hand, to identify the presence of amoralist themes and issues in Rousseau’s work; on the other, to reveal the existence of materialist principles in the Spinozist ethical itinerary. (shrink)

Spinoza attributes mentality to all things existing in nature. He claims that each thing has a mind that perceives everything that happens in the body. Against this panpsychist background, it is unclear how consciousness relates to the nature of the mind. This study focuses on Spinoza’s account of the conscious mind and its operations. It builds on the hypothesis that Spinoza’s panpsychism can be interpreted as a self-consistent philosophical position. It aims at providing answers to the following questions: what is (...) consciousness, for Spinoza, and what are the causes that determine its presence in nature? How can human and non-human individuals be distinguished on account of their mentality? How can Spinoza conceive of the human mind as consisting entirely of conscious perceptions? And how, according to Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism, is the content of consciousness determined so that it reflects in thought the order and connection of the actions and passions of the body? To address these questions, I first determine what Spinoza’s notion of “consciousness” is and how he uses it. Then, I investigate whether he has a theory of recognition capable of accounting for specifically human behaviour and mentality. Further, I examine his description of memory and the way in which memory shapes the framework of human conscious thought. Finally, I look for an account of discursive reasoning, capable of explaining the existence of activities of the mind that, by operating on the content provided by memory, preserve themselves through time and change. (shrink)