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  1. Ignorance in Plato’s Protagoras.Wenjin Liu - 2022 - Phronesis 67 (3):309-337.
    Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of (...)
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  • Can Flogging Make Us Less Ignorant?Freya Möbus - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy 43 (1):51-68.
    In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.
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  • Pleasure, Pain, and the Unity of Soul in Plato's Protagoras.Vanessa de Harven & Wolfgang-Rainer Mann - 2018 - In William V. Harris (ed.), Pleasure and Pain in Classical Antiquity. pp. 111-138.
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  • Dangerous Voices: On Written and Spoken Discourse in Plato’s Protagoras.Pettersson Olof - 2017 - In Plato’s Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry. Springer. pp. 177-198.
    Plato’s Protagoras contains, among other things, three short but puzzling remarks on the media of philosophy. First, at 328e5–329b1, Plato makes Socrates worry that long speeches, just like books, are deceptive, because they operate in a discursive mode void of questions and answers. Second, at 347c3–348a2, Socrates argues that discussion of poetry is a presumptuous affair, because, the poems’ message, just like the message of any written text, cannot be properly examined if the author is not present. Third, at 360e6–361d6, (...)
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  • Sex, Wealth, and Courage: Kinds of Goods and the Power of Appearance in Plato's Protagoras.Damien Storey - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (2):241-263.
    I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...)
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