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  1. Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (123):213-236.
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  • Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.
    Can Hart's non-cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction-based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non-cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary (...)
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  • Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (6):725-752.
    Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case (...)
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  • First person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions.Martin F. Fricke - 2013 - Critica 45 (134):3-16.
    ¿Qué relación existe entre la autoridad de la primera persona y el conocimiento de las propias acciones? Una posibilidad es que gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para actuar sabemos qué es lo que hacemos y, análogamente, gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para admitir [avow] una creencia sabemos qué es lo que creemos. Carlos Moya atribuye una teoría de este tipo a Richard Moran y la critica por ser circular. En este trabajo examino la teoría (...)
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  • First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions.Martin F. Fricke - 2013 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (134):3-16.
    What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...)
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  • Responsabilidad, autoría Y voluntad: La propuesta de Moran.Miranda Del Corral - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (1):207-230.
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