In this paper I present firstly the close resemblance of two famous philosophical arguments, namely Moore’s open question argument and the so-called zombie or absent qualia argument. Then, based on their similarity, I argue for the tenability and prima facie plausibility of a theoretical position in the mind-body problem which I call one-term physicalism, and which is almost entirely missing from the relevant literature. The argumentation primarily leans on the fact that a parallel position in metaethics, namely one-term naturalism, is (...) a widely discussed legitimate view. In order to underpin the argumentation from this analogy, at first, I present – mainly after Nicholas Sturgeon – a sharp criticism of the open question argument, and then show how one can develop one-term naturalism from this criticism. Secondly, I argue that the same criticism can be made of the zombie argument, and therefore we could define a similar theoretical position in the philosophy of mind. After all these I speak about the main motivation for en-dorsing one-term naturalism– and also the problems of this –, namely the so-called causal criterion strat-egy which leans on the supposed causal role of moral properties, and show that the same motivation is present also in the case of one-term physicalism. Moreover, I argue that in the latter case the motivation is even stronger, since we have stronger intuitions for the causal efficacy of phenomenal than of moral properties, and so the problems of the argumentative strategy in question seems to be more solvable. (shrink)