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Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?

Brendan Murday

Philosophia 45 (3):1313-1330 (2017)

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A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will.Dwayne Moore - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of a nonreductive physicalist model of libertarian (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.details Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
(1 other version)Free Will, Values, and Narrative Selfhood.Alessandro Fiorello - 2020 - Philosophia 44 (1):1-20.details Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Free Will, Values, and Narrative Selfhood.Alessandro Fiorello - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):115-132.details Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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