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Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of (...) |
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Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues ( 2022 ) argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it (...) |
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Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 187-189, July 2022. |
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I strongly agree with the criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition of empathy made by Murphy, Lilienfeld, and Algoe (2022), and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, (...) |
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Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues ( 2022 ) argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it (...) |
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