Communicating an unfavourable prognosis while maintaining patient hope represents a critical challenge for healthcare professionals. Duty requires respect for the right to patient autonomy while at the same time not doing harm by causing hopelessness and demoralisation. In some cases, the need for therapeutic privilege is discussed. The primary objectives of this study were to explore HPs’ perceptions of hope in the prognosis communication and investigate how they interpret and operationalise key ethical principles. Sixteen qualitative semistructured interviews with HPs from (...) different positions and experience, including doctors and nurses in four different departments, were conducted in the Ticino Cantonal Hospital, Switzerland. The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic analysis. HPs defined prognosis and patient hope as interdependent concepts related to future perspectives for subjective quality of life. Two main factors allow HPs to maximise the benefits and minimise the harm of their communication: respecting the patient’s timing and sharing the patient’s wishes. Time is required to reframe needs and expectations. Furthermore, communication needs to be shared by HPs, patients and their relatives to build common awareness and promote a person-centred approach to prognosis. In this process, interprofessional collaboration is key: doctors and nurses are complementary and can together guarantee that patients and relatives receive information in the most appropriate form when they need it. Organisational aspects and the HPs’ emotional difficulties, particularly in coping with their own despair, are barriers to effective communication that need further investigation. (shrink)

Philosophical Psychology is dedicating this issue on trust and trustworthiness to Katherine Hawley (1971–2021) for two reasons. First, she was an expert in the area. Hawley was one of the most rele...

When seriously ill patients reach the end of the standard treatment trajectory for their condition, they may qualify for the use of unapproved, investigational drugs regulated via expanded access programs. In medical-ethical discourse, it is often argued that expanded access to investigational drugs raises ‘false hope’ among patients and is therefore undesirable. We set out to investigate what is meant by the false hope argument in this discourse. In this paper, we identify and analyze five versions of the false hope (...) argument which we call: (1) the limited chance at benefit argument, (2) the side effects outweighing benefits argument, (3) the opportunity costs argument, (4) the impossibility of making informed decisions argument, and (5) the difficulty of gaining access argument. We argue that the majority of these five versions do not provide normative ground for disqualifying patients’ hopes as false. Only when hope is rooted in a mistaken belief, for example, about the likelihood of benefits or chances on medical risks, or when hope is directed at something that cannot possibly be obtained, should it be considered false. If patients are adequately informed about their odds of obtaining medical benefit, however small, and about the risks associated with an investigational treatment, it is unjustified to consider patients’ hopes to be false, and hence, to deny them access to investigational drug based on that argument. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that it is important to ensure that patients undergoing medical procedures hope that their treatments will be successful. But why is hope so important, if indeed it is? After examining the answers currently on offer in the literature, we identify a hitherto unrecognized reason for supposing that it is important that patients possess hope for a successful treatment, which draws on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky’s hugely influential descriptive theory about decision-making in situations of risk and (...) uncertainty. We also consider some concerns about patient consent and the potential manipulation of patients that are raised by our account. (shrink)

Despite the frequent invocation of ‘false hope’ and possible related moral concerns in the context of assisted reproduction technologies, a focused ethical and conceptual problematisation of this concept seems to be lacking. We argue that an invocation of ‘false hope’ only makes sense if the fulfilment of a desired outcome (eg, a successful fertility treatment) is impossible, and if it is attributed from an external perspective. The evaluation incurred by this third party may foreclose a given perspective from being an (...) object of hope. However, this evaluation is not a mere statistical calculation or observation based on probabilities but is dependent on several factors that should be acknowledgeable as morally relevant. This is important because it allows room for, and encourages, reasoned disagreement and moral negotiation. Accordingly, the object of hope itself, whether or not based on socially embedded desires or practices, can be a topic of debate. (shrink)

Metaphysics often has an important role in deciding ethical questions. Specifically, in the realm of bioethics, metaphysical questions such as the nature of persons, diseases, and properties in general can be crucial to determining what is right or wrong. In this article, I tie together various metaphysical themes that recur throughout the rest of the issue: rationality as an element of human nature, ontological classifications, and kinds of action. I will explain that each has ethical implications. Actions that contravene reason (...) will be morally problematic, whereas our classification of illnesses will have important implications for how we ought to respond to ill persons. Metaphysical questions appear, or are at least suggested, in each article, pointing to the need for metaphysics in answering bioethical questions. (shrink)

BackgroundFunctional neurodiagnostics could allow researchers and clinicians to distinguish more accurately between the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and the minimally conscious state. It remains unclear how it informs surrogate decision-making.ObjectiveTo explore how the next of kin of patients with disorders of consciousness interpret the results of a functional neurodiagnostics measure and how/why their interpretations influence their attitudes towards medical decisions.Methods and SampleWe conducted problem-centered interviews with seven next of kin of patients with DOC who had undergone a functional HD-EEG examination at (...) a neurological rehabilitation center in Germany. The examination included an auditory oddball paradigm and a motor imagery task to detect hidden awareness. We analyzed the interview transcripts using structuring qualitative content analysis.ResultsRegardless of the diagnostic results, all participants were optimistic of the patients’ meaningful recovery. We hypothesize, that participants deal with the results of examinations according to their belief system. Thus, an unfavorable evaluation of the patient’s state had the potential to destabilize the participant’s belief system. To re-stabilize or to prevent the destabilization of their belief system, participants used different strategies. Participants accepted a “positive” HD-EEG result since it stabilized their belief system.ConclusionWe hypothesize, that a group of next of kin of patients with DOC deals with functional neurodiagnostics results on the basis of the result’s value and their high hope that the patient will recover meaningfully. A psychological mechanism seems to moderate the impact of functional neurodiagnostics on surrogate treatment decisions. (shrink)