Italy is in the forefront of forensic neuroscience practice among European nations. In recent years, the country presented two major criminal cases, the Trieste Case in 2009 and the Como Case in 2011, which were the first cases employing neurogenetic and functional neuroimaging methods in European courts. In this paper we will discuss the consequences that an understanding of the neural and genetic determinants of human (mis)behavior will have on law, especially on the Italian legal context. Some claim that such (...) consequences will actually be revolutionary, while others argue that legal doctrine assumptions won’t be undermined by neuroscientific findings. In the first section of the paper, we introduce the general debate and follow with a section devoted to the two Italian cases. In the third and final section, we discuss epistemological and ethical issues regarding Italian neurolaw. We defend a position which diverges from those prevailing in the debate. While negative outcomes and concerns were usually evidenced, we focus on positive changes coming with the new paradigm of interaction between neuroscience and the law. Our view is that these cases are clearly pioneering ones, anticipating what will happen in the courtrooms of the European Union in the whole, in the near future. (shrink)

Genetic testing practices are increasingly advancing clinical medicine. This process of ‘routinisation of genetics’ has been conceived as a medical and ethical problem mainly because of the assumption that non-geneticists might lack the necessary skills to provide these services. In particular, the relevant theoretical knowledge in clinical genetics is viewed as insufficient in general practitioners and physicians from other specialities. Empirical findings seem to indicate significant variations not only in theoretical but also in practical knowledge between geneticists and non-geneticists. Several (...) fields of practical knowledge—regarding for example the focus of clinical action, the relevance of therapeutic action or the normative framework—can be identified that are or could be areas of conflict when the routinisation of genetic services proceeds. From an ethical point of view, these variations in know how and background are especially relevant whenever the respective genetic service is concerned with medical information of exceptional normative quality, such as, for example, in prenatal genetic screening and diagnosis of untreatable conditions. Here, the clinically acquired practical knowledge of the non-geneticist could be particularly misleading insofar as there is no relation to therapy and—in a narrow sense—no clinical utility to be assessed. Non-geneticists need a chance to acquire the relevant theoretical and practical knowledge in order to understand and fulfil their own duties in the respective situations in a way that secures the important rights at stake of their patients and clients. (shrink)