In the years around 1900 one of the most significant practical consequences of new styles of bacteriological thought and practice was the development of preventive vaccines and therapeutic sera. Historical scholarship has highlighted how approaches rooted in the laboratory methods of Robert Koch, Louis Pasteur and their collaborators were transformed in local contexts and applied in diverse ways to enable more effective disease identification, prevention and treatment. Amongst these, the anti-anthrax serum developed by the Italian physician Achille Sclavo (1861–1930) has (...) received little to no attention from historians. This article positions Sclavo's serum as a neglected but significant presence in British microbiology, which achieved widespread uptake amidst a wave of optimism, despite prolonged uncertainty about its mechanism of action and dosage. After being introduced to Britain in 1904 by the enterprising first medical inspector of factories Thomas Morison Legge, within a matter of months the serum became regarded by medical practitioners as an effective treatment of cutaneous anthrax, though access to ‘fresh’ serum and the necessary speedy diagnosis remained problematic. Like the disease anthrax itself, discussion of ‘Sclavo's serum’ was out of all proportion to the relatively low number of cases, reflecting a deep-seated fascination with the wider possibilities afforded by effective serum therapy. (shrink)

From the 1660s onwards, France tried to establish itself as a leading maritime and colonial power. The first French East India Company allowed a decisive penetration into the Indian Ocean, while the foundation of the Rochefort arsenal was the starting point of a great shipbuilding effort. The archives of the State Secretariat of the French Navy, ports, and learned societies, as well as printed scholarly literature, testify to an increasing mobilisation around the health of the “gens de mer.” Most of (...) the actors involved in this reflection, whether doctors or surgeons, naval officers or engineers, scholars or inventors, agreed in associating seamen's diseases with the poor air quality prevailing within ships. The environment of seafarers was thus definitely regarded as harmful. However, the atmosphere of a ship was also seen through the possibility to reshape it and reduce its dangerousness, with adapted behaviours, careful maintenance, or technical solutions. This was crucial to ensure the circulation of human beings and goods across the French overseas empire, but also to defend it from the threats associated with the major conflicts of the second half of the 18th century. This article highlights how environments regarded as “pathogenic” were conceived and reshaped during the second half of the early modern period in France, using the example of naval hygiene. It examines the strategies designed and implemented to combat the “noxious” air of French ships, in particular through the regulations introduced since the end of the 17th century, and considers how this issue has stimulated the search for technological solutions. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of the reporting practice and paper technologies like forms on reports that were later used for national morbidity statistics by studying the Swiss reporting system for infectious diseases between 1886 and 1921. Analysing the production processes of notifications shows the difficulties and solutions in the implementation of the statutory reporting process. Two disease outbreaks—a smallpox outbreak in Schaffhausen and a typhoid outbreak in the canton of Lucerne—serve as case studies. It is shown that reports are (...) not only objective representations of diseases, but also symbolize the medico-social interactions that produce them, timed by administrative tools like reporting forms and the act of reporting. This destabilises historical statistics and illustrates the complexity of the historical source material, as these interactions and their impact on reporting must be considered. These findings are further supported by examining the Swiss reporting system during the Spanish flu of 1918 and its failure to record influenza cases. (shrink)

Over the course of the Progressive Era, revised scientific accounts of the connections between dust, germs, and disease recast debates over public health. The American School of Home Economics and other institutions affiliated with the emerging subfield of household bacteriology regarded detecting and eliminating pathogens as necessary means to achieve safer homes and communities. Although several historians have attributed the rise of early twentieth-century technocracy and the decline of grassroots health activism to germ theory, household bacteriology complicates this standard narrative. (...) Educators like Sophronia Maria Elliott (1854–1942) rejected the command-and-control tactics of the “new” public health and instead instructed women how to culture microorganisms and to measure the risks of infection within their surrounding environments using kitchen experiments. Household bacteriologists aspired to train “sanitary citizens” with the right and the duty to test for germs with everyday equipment, to prevent disease with effective housekeeping, and to advocate for policies and infrastructure to keep society well. (shrink)

During the Italian campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars (1796–1801), several epidemic outbreaks sparked acrimonious aetiological debates: were the fevers spread by soldiers and prisoners of war, or produced by environmental factors? This debate was not only a scientific issue, but also a political one, for causation was linked to accountability. Looking at a series of medical investigations written by French military practitioners, this paper argues that theories of contagion were used by civilians to accuse the army of spreading disease, (...) in what I describe as an “aetiology of blame.” Likewise, military officials attempted to absolve themselves of responsibility for the spread of disease by focusing on unwholesome environments, depicting diseases as unavoidable fatalities. Military doctors thus supported French imperial endeavours by obscuring the army's responsibility for the spread of diseases, putting forward aetiologies of fate and blaming individual behaviour. Even when they did not radically dismiss contagionist perspectives, military practitioners insisted on a wide range of pathogenic causes. Their discourses were in line with medical theories of the time, but they downplayed the responsibility of the army for the spread of diseases, which they depicted as a factor among others. Military doctors were thus not always involved in the direct and deliberate production of ignorance, but they did sustain controversies and uncertainty. (shrink)