Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have undergone extensive interpretation over many years. One such interpretive work is George Myerson's book Rhetoric, Reason and Society. Myerson's interest in dialogic rationalism leads him to examine the views of many theorists of rationality, philosophers and non-philosophers alike. As a prominent philosopher of rationality, Putnam is at the very center of this examination. Notwithstanding this fact, I contend that Myerson misinterprets the dialectical character of Putnam's philosophy in general and of Putnam's views on rationality in (...) particular. This misinterpretation, I argue, is revealing of an illusion of thought to which Myerson is subject, an illusion that makes it seem that it is possible to theorize intelligibly about rationality from a metaphysical standpoint. This same illusion, I claim, also makes it seem that Myerson's positive views on rationality are intelligible. Employing a close textual analysis of Myerson's book, I argue that neither scenario is the case. (shrink)

The study of argument has never before been so wide-ranging. The evidence for this claim is to be found in a growing number of different conceptions of argument, each of which purports to describe some component of argument that is effectively over-looked by other conceptions of this notion. Just this same sense that a vital component of argument is being overlooked by current conceptions of this notion is what motivates Dale Hample to pursue a specifically cognitive conception of argument. However, (...) Hamples contribution to the study of argument extends beyond his development of a view of argument as cognition. For Hample is reflective on the interrelationship of his cognitive conception of argument to two other views of argument within which most conceptions of this notion may be taken to fall, the traditional view of argument as a textual product and the view of argument as a social phenomenon. I will argue, however, that what starts out as a well-intentioned aim on the part of Hample to pursue a comprehensive analysis of the notion of argument ends in the circumscription of this concept through Hample s denial of the primacy of argument. I will also argue that a circumscribed concept of argument is an unintelligible concept of argument. The context of my claims will be a similar charge of unintelligibility by Hilary Putnam against a logical positivistic conception of rationality. (shrink)

It is contended that Jurgen Habermas's (1972, 1984) attempts to overcome the problems that positivist thought has caused for theorizing rationality has actually exacerbated positivism's negative effects on conceptualizing rational thought. An overview of Hilary Putnam's (1981) examination of logical positivism's understanding of rationality is presented, emphasizing that positivist approaches toward theorizing rationality are essentially self-refuting in nature since they utilize a metaphysical perspective. Potential objections to the delineation of logical positivism's account of rationality as self-refuting are addressed. Habermas' analysis (...) of positivism's influence on rationality & his concept of communicative competence are then reviewed. Examination of Habermas' attempt to establish a "universal pragmatics" & his contention that validity claims are rationalized through argumentative discourse is performed, leading to the conclusion that such theorizing of rationality is ultimately metaphysical in nature. Treatments of rationality that attempt to impart a comprehensive account of rationality are deemed unintelligible; consequently, it is maintained that all-encompassing delineations of rationality should be avoided in order to produce viable theories of rational thought. (shrink)