I argue that Wolfhart Pannenberg’s view of human subjectivity presupposes a metaphysics of eternity that both contracts and expands the human subject. For this purpose, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is a useful criterion. Pannenberg rejects substantialist theories of subjectivity that give priority to the agency of the ego over the passivity of the self. Following Friedrich Schleiermacher, Pannenberg thinks self-reflection must be grounded on a symbiotic totality of life, and he views essences, even of subjectivity, as determined by that totality. In (...) contrast, Husserl provides both an essentialist theory of subjectivity and a viable model for self-reflection that does not suffer from infinite regress. Husserl does more justice to the mineness of consciousness and the agency of the ego, while not discarding the narrativity of the self. (shrink)