The Upaniṣads, as one of the trilogy of principal Vedāntic texts, the oldest and the most fundamental of them, have exposed a more or less detailed discussion on dreaming, taking it whether as the factual object of their discourse or as a symbol. However, there has been a debate between different schools of Vedāntic philosophy about oneirology, science of dreams and their interpretation, discussion of nature of the dream state, its reality and unreality. This paper, after a short study of (...) oneirology in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, examines argumentations of four great philosophers of different Vedāntic schools, Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, pertaining to dreams. (shrink)

The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of Śaṅkara. While Bhavya’s criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puruṣavāda in Dvādaśāranayacakra has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize (...) the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puruṣa, central to this paper, sidelines the role of avidyā or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary Vṛtti upon the Vākyapadīya as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puruṣa also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism. (shrink)

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (...) (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana. (shrink)

This paper aims to make an anti-canonical reading of the avivakṣitavācya-variety of dhvani conceptualized by the ninth century Sanskrit literary critic Ānandavardhana in his seminal work Dhvanyāloka. In this paper, I argue that avivakṣitavācya-dhvani opens up a signifier to new significations that are not conventionally associated with it through a process of deterritorialization. In any language, convention functions as a structuring mechanism upon a signifier by clearly demarcating a rigid semantic ambit for it. By the term ‘conventional semantic ambit’, I (...) mean the boundary of signification set by convention for each signifier. The primary problem associated with the imposition of a definite territory upon a signifier is that it prevents an individual signifier from representing any new significations that are not conventionally attached to it. For example, in the conventional semantic ambit, the word ‘cat’ cannot represent the idea of a ‘dog’. In the act of mapping a fixed territory for each signifier, convention also structures the individual-user of the language by forcing him or her to confine to a specific plan of dealing with signifiers. Thus, the individual user of language within a conventional semantic ambit is rendered absolutely passive, as s/he has nothing new to contribute or create, other than reproducing an always-already existing plan of functioning. It is precisely this structuring tendency of convention that gets challenged in Ānanda’s avivakṣitavācya-dhvani. Such a mechanism is definitely a liberating experience for both the signifier and the individual-users of the language who are forced to accept the signifiers in a specific fashion. Along with the exposition of avivakṣitavācya-dhvani’s resistance to a signifier’s conventional semantic ambit, this paper also aims to conceptualize the figure of the reader that avivakṣitavācya-dhvani anticipates for itself. (shrink)

Assigning a date to Kumārila is notoriously difficult. Kumārila’s dates are usually assigned through a relative chronology of Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophers with whom Kumārila engages or is engaged. This is a precarious method because the dates of these interlocutors are equally unstable. But what if in considering systematic dialogues (_śāstra_) to be the primary medium for interreligious philosophical debate we have missed a source that does engage with Kumārila, and that can be reliably dated? In this article, I turn (...) to a religious group whom, it has been previously thought, did not respond to Kumārila until the eighth century—Jainas—as well as to a genre that is not typically viewed as a site of systematic philosophical dialogue—narrative. I argue that the _Padmacarita_, a Jaina Rāmāyaṇa composed by a Digambara writer called Raviṣeṇa, contains a narrative refutation of Kumārila’s commentary to _Mīmāṃsāsūtra_ 1.1.2. By bringing to light this refutation, and explaining how Raviṣeṇa’s _Padmacarita_ can be reliably dated, I assign Kumārila’s _terminus ante quem_ to the date of the _Padmacarita_’s composition, 676 CE. Finally, I suggest that Raviṣeṇa’s _Padmacarita_ is the earliest extant Jaina text to discuss Kumārila’s claims, and that Jainas used narrative to reflect on Mīmāṃsā before they turned to _śāstra_ as another medium for this dialogue. (shrink)

The oldest preserved commentary on the Br̥hadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad was composed by Śaṅkara. Sureśvara composed a sub-commentary on this commentary, while Ānandagiri composed commentaries both on Śaṅkara’s commentary and on Sureśvara’s sub-commentary. All these four books contain a number of passages from earlier works which are not preserved. Sureśvara and Ānandagiri attributed some of these passages to a commentator named Bhartr̥prapañca. The aim of this article is to present a philological method which will establish which of the passages might be paraphrases and (...) which might be quotations from Bhartr̥prapañca’s lost commentary composed in the scope of the bhedābheda theory. This article will argue that Śaṅkara paraphrases Bhartr̥prapañca’s text, while Ānandagiri quotes most probably Bhartr̥prapañca’s text literally. This text was metrically adjusted by Sureśvara who paraphrases Bhartr̥prapañca by shortening and adjusting the original text in order to fit into the pattern of the śloka meter. If this is true, it is possible to establish a methodology which may help us to reconstruct portions of the oldest known commentary on the Br̥hadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. (shrink)

The historical pole of this research distinguishes differing historical and cultural contexts in which the scholar al-Bïrûnî evolved. Between the years 973 and 1017, he lived in Khwarezm (Kät and JürjänTya), Ray, and Jürjän. He also dwelt in Kabul and Ghazna, both situated on a passage between Persia and India, and travelled to some parts of early medieval India between the years 1017 and 1030. Evidence pointing to him having made actual direct observations beyond the abode of Islam remains scanty. (...) According to his writings, only five locales emerge as having been visited by him, all situated in today's Afghanistan and Pakistan. When al-BTrunl visited these places, he encountered the society of the Indian Shähis, who followed a form of Brahmanism. Al-Bïrûnï's knowledge of Sanskrit was the result of a long process that lasted at least 30 years (1000-1030). In order to reach the level of Sanskrit that enabled him to translate several works from Sanskrit into Arabic, he needed to work with literate people well-versed in Sanskrit, who may also have had some comprehension of Arabic, and/or Persian. The textual pole of this dissertation examines the question of the relationship between al- Bïrûnï's Arabic Kitab Sank and Kitäb Pätangal - two works related to Sämkhya-Yoga - and their possible Sanskrit sources. A philological survey based on these Arabic translations and on Sämkhya-Yoga Sanskrit literature highlights that al-Bïrûnï's translations, both, are related to the classical phase in the development of these two Indian philosophical systems. Despite the early spread of Yoga and Sämkhya ideas through Sanskrit literature, it seems that between the early 11th and 16th centuries they lost vitality amongst Indian scholars. Therefore, al-Bïrûnï's translation of works related to these specific Indian philosophies in the early 11th century CE deserves attention. The second pole of this study also demonstrates that al-BTrünl's hermeneutics played an important part in his transmission of these two Indian schools of thought, as he highly transformed his source in both form and substance. This dissertation considers the question of the relationship between al-Bïrûnï's Arabic translations and their possible Sanskrit sources from the viewpoint of Translation Studies; which makes it possible to point out potential candidates for being al-Bïrûnï's original Sanskrit sources with some confidence. Overall, the Kitäb Sank and the Kitäb Pätangal represent original works of Sämkhya and Yoga, as viewed and transmitted by a Perso-Muslim scholar, rather than pure translations of Sanskrit work. (shrink)