Environment learning is essential in everyday life. In individuals with Down syndrome (DS), this skill has begun to be examined using virtual exploration. Previous studies showed that individuals with DS can learn and remember paths in terms of sequences of turns and straight stretches, albeit with some difficulty, and this learning is supported by their cognitive abilities. This study further investigates environment learning in the DS population, newly examining their ability to learn a path from actual movements, and to learn (...) increasingly long paths, and how their performance relates to their visuo-spatial abilities and everyday spatial activities. A group of 30 individuals with DS and 30 typically-developing (TD) children matched for receptive vocabulary performed a 4 × 4 Floor Matrix task in a grid comprising 16 squares (total area 2.3 × 2.3 meters). The task involved repeating increasingly long sequences of steps by actually moving in the grid. The sequences were presented in two learning conditions, called Observation (when participants watched the experimenter’s moves), or Map (when they were shown a map reproducing the path). Several visuo-spatial measures were also administered. The results showed a clear difference between the two groups’ performance in the individual visuo-spatial measures. In the Floor Matrix task, after controlling for visuo-spatial reasoning ability, both groups benefited to the same degree from the Observation condition vis-à-vis the Map condition, and no group differences emerged. In the group with DS, visuo-spatial abilities were more predictive of performance in the Floor Matrix task in the Observation condition than in the Map condition. The same was true of the TD group, but this difference was much less clear-cut. The visuo-spatial working memory and visualization tasks were the strongest predictors of Floor Matrix task performance. Finally, the group with DS showed a significant relation between Floor Matrix task performance in the Observation condition and everyday spatial activity. These results enlarge on what we know about path learning in individuals with DS and its relation to their visuo-spatial abilities. These findings are discussed within the frame of spatial cognition and the atypical development domain. (shrink)

In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust’s theory of conscious experience and show how it leads him directly to a theory of aesthetic perception. Proust’s division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William (...) James’ division of the stream of thought into a “nucleus” and “fringe.” Proust argues that the function of art is to evoke the underlying associative network indirectly in the mind of the observer by using carefully chosen sensory surfaces to control the stream of thought. I propose a possible neural basis for this Proustian/Jamesian phenomenology, and argue that the general principles of Proustian aesthetics can be applied to all forms of art. I conclude that a scientific theory of art should follow in a straightforward manner from a scientific theory of consciousness. (shrink)

It is frequently claimed that the human mind is organized in a modular fashion, a hypothesis linked historically, though not inevitably, to the claim that many aspects of the human mind are innately specified. A specific instance of this line of thought is the proposal of an innately specified geometric module for human reorientation. From a massive modularity position, the reorientation module would be one of a large number that organized the mind. From the core knowledge position, the reorientation module (...) is one of five innate and encapsulated modules that can later be supplemented by use of human language. In this paper, we marshall five lines of evidence that cast doubt on the geometric module hypothesis, unfolded in a series of reasons: (1) Language does not play a necessary role in the integration of feature and geometric cues, although it can be helpful. (2) A model of reorientation requires flexibility to explain variable phenomena. (3) Experience matters over short and long periods. (4) Features are used for true reorientation. (5) The nature of geometric information is not as yet clearly specified. In the final section, we review recent theoretical approaches to the known reorientation phenomena. (shrink)