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How not to solve it

Philosophy of Science 53 (1):114-119 (1986)

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  1. The psychology of dynamic probability judgment: order effect, normative theories, and experimental methodology.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (1):53-66.
    The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe is static (revising situations). However, it may happen that individuals have to revise their degrees of belief when the message they learn specifies a change of direction in the universe, which is considered as changing (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to solve probability teasers-discussion.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (2):348-358.
    Recently, Nathan criticized Bar-Hillel and Falk's analysis of some classical probability puzzles on the grounds that they wrongheadedly applied mathematics to the solving of problems suffering from “ambiguous informalities”. Nathan's prescription for solving such problems boils down to assuring in advance that they are uniquely and formally soluble—though he says little about how this is to be done. Unfortunately, in real life problems seldom show concern as to whether their naturally occurring formulation is or is not ambiguous, does or does (...)
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  • A commentary on Mel Rutherford’s ‘On the use and misuse of the “two children” brainteaser’.Maya Bar-Hillel - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (1):175-179.
    Rutherford criticizes the way some people have analyzed the 2-children problem, claiming that slight nuances in the problem’s formulation can change the correct answer. However, his own data demonstrate that even when there is a unique correct answer, participants give intuitive answers that differ from it systematically — replicating the data reported by those he criticizes. Thus, his critique reduces to an admonition to use care in formulating and analyzing this brainteaser — which is always a good idea — but (...)
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  • Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”.Shinsuke Shimojo & Shin'Ichi Ichikawa - 1989 - Cognition 32 (1):1-24.
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  • (1 other version)How to solve probability teasers.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (2):348-358.
    Recently, Nathan (1986) criticized Bar-Hillel and Falk's (1982) analysis of some classical probability puzzles on the grounds that they wrongheadedly applied mathematics to the solving of problems suffering from "ambiguous informalities". Nathan's prescription for solving such problems boils down to assuring in advance that they are uniquely and formally soluble--though he says little about how this is to be done. Unfortunately, in real life problems seldom show concern as to whether their naturally occurring formulation is or is not ambiguous, does (...)
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