The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists can more formally 'stake their reputation', is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent in (...) examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study. (shrink)

Why is common priors are implicit or explicit in the vast majority of the differential information literature in economics and game theory? Why has the economic community been unwilling, in practice, to accept and actually use the idea of truly personal probabilities in much the same way that it did accept the idea of personal utility functions? After all, in, both the utilities and probabilities are derived separately for each decision maker. Why were the utilities accepted as personal, and the (...) probabilities not? (shrink)

Because intelligent agents employ physically embodied cognitive systems to reason about the world, their cognitive abilities are constrained by the laws of physics. Scientists have used digital computers to develop and validate theories of physically embodied cognition. Computational theories of intelligence have advanced our understanding of the nature of intelligence and have yielded practically useful systems exhibiting some degree of intelligence. However, the view of cognition as algorithms running on digital computers rests on implicit assumptions about the physical world that (...) are incorrect. Recently, the view is emerging of computing systems as goal-directed agents, evolving during problem solving toward improved world models and better task performance. A full realization of this vision requires a new logic for computing that incorporates learning from experience as an intrinsic part of the logic, and that permits full exploitation of the quantum nature of the physical world. This paper proposes a theory of physically embodied cognitive agents founded upon first-order logic, Bayesian decision theory, and quantum physics. An abstract architecture for a physically embodied cognitive agent is presented. The cognitive aspect is represented as a Bayesian decision theoretic agent; the physical aspect is represented as a quantum process; and these aspects are related through von Neumann’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism. Alternative metaphysical positions regarding the meaning of quantum probabilities and the role of efficacious choices by agents are discussed in relation to the abstract agent architecture. The concepts are illustrated with an extended example from the domain of science fiction. (shrink)

De Finetti's treatise on the theory of probability begins with the provocative statement PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST, meaning that probability does not exist in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists only subjectively within the minds of individuals. De Finetti defined subjective probabilities in terms of the rates at which individuals are willing to bet money on events, even though, in principle, such betting rates could depend on state-dependent marginal utility for money as well as on beliefs. Most later authors, from (...) Savage onward, have attempted to disentangle beliefs from values by introducing hypothetical bets whose payoffs are abstract consequences that are assumed to have state-independent utility. In this paper, I argue that de Finetti was right all along: PROBABILITY, considered as a numerical measure of pure belief uncontaminated by attitudes toward money, does not exist. Rather, what exist are de Finetti's `previsions', or betting rates for money, otherwise known in the literature as `risk neutral probabilities'. But the fact that previsions are not measures of pure belief turns out not to be problematic for statistical inference, decision analysis, or economic modeling. (shrink)

Two institutions that are often implicit or overlooked in noncooperative games are the assumption of Nash behavior to solve a game, and the ability to correlate strategies. We consider two behavioral paradoxes; one in which maximin behavior rules out all Nash equilibria (‘Chicken’), and another in which minimax supergame behavior leads to an ‘inefficient’ outcome in comparison to the unique stage game equilibrium (asymmetric ‘Deadlock’). Nash outcomes are achieved in both paradoxes by allowing for correlated strategies, even when individual behavior (...) remains minimax or maximin. However, the interpretation of correlation as a public institution differs for each case. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber illuminate many aspects of reasoning and rationality, providing refreshing and thoughtful analysis and elegant and well‐researched illustrations. They make a good case that reasoning should be viewed as a type of intuition, rather than a separate cognitive process or system. Yet questions remain. In what sense, if any, is reasoning a “module?” What is the link between rationality within an individual and rationality defined through the interaction between individuals? Formal theories of rationality, from logic, probability theory and (...) game theory, while not the focus of Mercier and Sperber's book, may help clarify this latter question. (shrink)