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  1. The 'demented other' or simply 'a person'? Extending the philosophical discourse of Naue and Kroll through the situated self.Steven R. Sabat, Ann Johnson, Caroline Swarbrick & John Keady - 2011 - Nursing Philosophy 12 (4):282-292.
    This article presents a critique of an article previously featured in Nursing Philosophy (10: 26–33) by Ursula Naue and Thilo Kroll, who suggested that people living with dementia are assigned a negative status upon receipt of a diagnosis, holding the identity of the ‘demented other’. Specifically, in this critique, we suggest that unwitting use of the adjective ‘demented’ to define a person living with the condition is ill-informed and runs a risk of defining people through negative (self-)attributes, which has a (...)
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  • Withering Minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia.David M. Lyreskog - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (10):699-706.
    A prominent view on personal identity over time, Jeff McMahan’s ‘Embodied Mind Account’ (2002) holds that we cease to exist only once our brains can no longer sustain the basic capacity to uphold consciousness. One of the many implications of this view on identity persistence is that we continue to exist throughout even the most severe cases of dementia, until our consciousness irreversibly shuts down. In this paper, I argue that, while the most convincing of prominent accounts of personal identity (...)
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