En los años veinte del siglo pasado se constituye lo que luego se llamó la escuela de Cambridge en bioquímica. Bajo el liderazgo de Frederick Gowland Hopkins este grupo tenía como objetivo primario la consolidación de la naciente bioquímica. Una característica particular de este grupo fue el intento explícito de vincular el trabajo científico con la discusión filosófica. Sin embargo, algunos historiadores como Nils Roll-Hansen han cuestionado en duros términos la manera en la cual estos científicos apelaban a la filosofía. (...) En particular Roll-Hansen ha sugerido que los aspectos filosóficos del trabajo de estos investigadores tendrían un mero carácter propagandístico vinculado con el proyecto de la constitución de la bioquímica como una disciplina. En este trabajo voy a defender que es posible considerar a los principios filosóficos presentados por la escuela de Cambridge como algo más que una mera propaganda para un proyecto institucional. Para esto voy a comparar la relación entre los principios filosóficos y trabajo metodológico propuesto por la escuela de Cambridge con una propuesta contemporánea: el Análisis de Control Metabólico, una perspectiva en el estudio de la bioquímica cuyo trabajo metodológico se suele defender apelando a “principios filosóficos”. A pesar de la distancia temporal entre ambas escuelas, tanto la actitud de apelar a principios filosóficos como el campo de estudio científico son semejantes.In the twenties of the last century, the Cambridge school in biochemistry was established. Under the leadership of Frederick Gowland Hopkins this group had as its primary objective the consolidation of a new science: biochemistry. A particular feature of this group was the explicit attempt to link scientific work with philosophical discussion. However, some historians like Nils Roll-Hansen have harshly questioned the way in which these scientists appealed to philosophy. In particular Roll-Hansen has suggested that the philosophical aspects of the work of these researchers would have to be considered as propaganda, motivated by attempt stablish the biochemistry as a discipline. In this paper I am going to defend that it is possible to consider the philosophical principles presented by the Cambridge school as something more than a propaganda for an institutional project. To this end I am going to compare the relationship between the philosophical principles and methodological work proposed by the Cambridge school with a contemporary proposal: the Metabolic Control Analysis, a perspective in the study of biochemistry whose methodological work is usually defended by appealing to “philosophical principles”. Despite the temporal distance between the two schools, both the attitude of appealing to philosophical principles and their field of scientific study are similar. Key Words: Philosophy of Biochemistry; Metabolic Control Analysis; Cambridge School ARK: ark:/s18537960/2ak06yaaq. (shrink)

German Idealism still dominates most approaches in theoretical biology. This has led to a conception of organisms as tightly regulated self-forming systems where the demands of the whole organism dominate how the parts are coordinated. This article troubles this approach by presenting aspects of biology that refuse to be synthesized into a specific whole. I call this approach “goth biology” as it recognizes the murkiness of systems of knowledge, the loosely composite nature of most living things, and the continual haunting (...) of life by death. Methodologically, I use insights gleaned from the history of post-punk goth music to explore the role of aesthetics, timbres, and forms as elements of lives that bound disparate times and spaces without providing a unified synthesis. A form of biological experience, and a theory of how the body works, goth biology demands that one lose a conception of “self” in order to embrace the complexity of biological interactions. As the goth performance artist Anna-Varney Cantodea recently confessed in an interview: “I have long given up on any goals I might have had,” but this doesn’t keep me from being inspired by everything around me. (shrink)

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as (...) a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse. (shrink)

This article questions whether philosophical considerations play any substantial role in the actual process of scientific research. Using examples mostly from the nineteenth century, it suggests that scientists generally choose their basic theoretical orientation, and their research strategies, on the basis of non-rationalized feelings which might be described as instinct or intuition. In one case where methodological principles were the driving force (Charles Lyell's uniformitarian geology), the effect was counterproductive.

In this paper I argue that non-reductive physicalism (NRP) continues to rely on the ontological aspect of the layer cake model of the world (LCM). NRP is a post-unity account of the relationship between phenomena in the world in the sense that it has been developed in response to the perceived failure of the unity of science thesis. The LCM constitutes a framework for the organisation of phenomena in the world. It articulates the idea that phenomena in the world are (...) organised into levels. Specifically, that phenomena are layered into distinct, hierarchical levels of organisation. Historically, the unity of science thesis and the LCM have been intertwined; the LCM being the framework within which a unity of science might be possible. My argument will demonstrate that, despite a move away from unity of science positions, the LCM persists in post-unity accounts. In order to argue for this thesis, I present a close analysis of Oppenheim & Putnam’s classic presentation of the LCM; picking out the principle of hierarchic compositionality which, I argue, captures the ontological aspect of the LCM. I then demonstrate how NRP continues to rely upon the principle and, as a result, continues to support the ontological aspect of the LCM. This result is significant. It shows that whilst the rejection of the reductionist aspect of the thesis has served as the basis for post-unity positions these positions do not engage directly with the framework within which reduction might be facilitated – the LCM. Furthermore, it demonstrates that pluralist or disunity accounts of the relationship between phenomena in the world will also have to engage directly with the framework of the LCM in order to avoid being merely anti-reductionist. (shrink)

In the theory and history of ecology, Frederic Clements’s theory of plant communities is usually presented as the historical prototype and a paradigmatic example of synecological organicism, characterised by the assumption that ecological communities are functionally integrated units of mutually dependent species. In this paper, I will object to this standard interpretation of Clements’s theory. Undoubtedly, Clements compares plant communities with organisms and calls them “complex organisms” and “superorganisms”. Further, he can indeed be regarded as a proponent of ecological organicism—provided (...) that one defines ecological organicism as the interpretation of synecological units according to the model of the individual organism. However, Clements’s theory does not include the assumption that mutual dependence is a principle of the organisation of plant communities. Rather, he interprets plant communities as top-down control-hierarchical entities, in which subordinate species depend on dominant species—but not the other way around. Therefore, his theory represents what may be called ‘control-hierarchical organicism’ as against ‘mutualistic organicism’. The erroneous attribution to Clements of ‘mutualistic organicism’ might be due to an unawareness of the existence of different concepts of the organism. This unawareness results in the projection on Clements’s theory of a seemingly self-evident mutualistic concept of organism that Clements himself did not use as a basis for his theory of plant communities. (shrink)

In early German ecology, the key concept used to refer to a synecological unit was Biozönose. Taken together with the concept of the Biotop, it was also understood as an integrated higher-order unit of life, sometimes called a “Holozön”. These units were often perceived as having properties similar to those of individual organisms, and they informed the mainstream of German ecology until at least the late 1960s. Here I ask how “organismic” these concepts really were and what conceptual problems they (...) entailed. To do so, I focus on some almost forgotten dissident positions, especially those of Friedrich Simon Bodenheimer and Fritz Peus, which I contrast with the mainstream German ecology of the time. In a radical paper published in 1954 that postulated the “dissolution of the concepts of biocoenosis and biotope”, Peus in particular elicited a forceful response from many prominent German ecologists. An analysis of the ensuing debate, including especially a colloquium held in 1959 that was partly inspired by Peus’ paper, is helpful for sifting the various arguments proffered with respect to a quasi-organismic perception of the biocoenosis in German speaking ecology. Although German mainstream ecologists rejected the notion of the biocoenosis as a superorganism, ontological holism was quite common among them. Additionally, the mainstream concept of the biocoenosis was plagued by several methodological problems and much conceptual confusion, to which the “dissidents” rightly pointed. Some of these problems are still pertinent today, e.g. in connection with more modern concepts such as “ecosystem”. (shrink)

A crucial part of the knowledge of molecular biologists is procedural knowledge, that is, knowledge of how to do things in laboratories. Procedural knowledge of molecular biologists involves both perceptual-motor skills and cognitive skills. We discuss such skills required in performing the most commonly used molecular biology techniques, namely, Polymerase Chain Reaction and gel electrophoresis. We argue that procedural knowledge involved in performing these techniques is more than just knowing their protocols. Creative exploration and experience are essential for the acquisition (...) of procedural knowledge in molecular biology. With enough experience, molecular biologists make intuitive judgments without recourse to analytical reasoning. We propose that procedural knowledge is intuitive recognition of the patterns of one's environment that are the most relevant for making a decision or acting appropriately. Finally, we argue that knowledge of molecular biologists requires an integration of procedural knowledge and propositional knowledge. (shrink)