Switch to: References

Citations of:

Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices

Dana Kay Nelkin

The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):265-275 (2019)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):615-636.details Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
On the Top-Down Argument for the Ability to Do Otherwise.Leonhard Menges - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2459-2472.details The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Blame it on Disappointment: A Problem for Skepticism about Angry Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2):169-184.details Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?Derk Pereboom - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):257-264.details Contrary to what I have contended, Michael McKenna argues that basic desert does not have an essential role in the free will debate. On his alternative construal, what is central is whether our practice of holding morally responsible, and blaming in particular, can be justified, and what notion of free will is required for that justification. Notions distinct from basic desert can ground our practice, and so the free will debate is independent of basic desert. Here I argue that the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
The Three-Case Argument against the Moral Justificatory Significance of Basic Desert.Aleksandr Mishura - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (3):1327-1340.details This paper challenges the moral justificatory significance of the notion of basic desert. The notion of basic desert is commonly used in the literature to distinguish a specific sense of moral responsibility that depends on free will. In this sense, a person is morally responsible for an action if this action belongs to her in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1