The recent discovery of a fragmentary manuscript of Utpaladeva’s long commentary (Vivṛti or Ṭīkā) on his own Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā (ĪPK) and Vṛtti enables us to assess the role of this work as the real centre of gravity of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy as a whole, though the later Śaiva tradition chose instead Abhinavagupta’s Vimarśinī as the standard text. This brilliant, and more compact and accessible, text was copied and copied again during the centuries and became popular in south India too, where a (...) number of manuscripts in the principal southern scripts are still available. The success of a particular commentary is very often the indirect cause of the decline of the others, which are less and less read and, consequently, copied, until their complete or almost complete loss. Of the lengthy and difficult Vivṛti by Utpaladeva—corresponding to the extent of 8,000 ślokas (hence the traditional denomination of Aṣṭasāhasrī)—the fragmentary śāradā manuscript that has come to light covers only the section ĪPK I.3.6 through I.5.3. Although the portion of the recovered text is comparatively short (33 folios), it proves to be particularly important in the economy of Pratyabhijñā philosophy due to the crucial points being dealt with there at great length, always in a hard-fought debate with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism. (shrink)

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection using the key metaphors of light and reflective awareness. This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the (...) concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper. (shrink)

This paper engages Abhinavagupta’s philosophy of “aham,” “I” or “I-am,” in a global philosophical platform. Abhinavagupta reads aham to ground speech in experiencing and expressing subjectivity. The aham, in this background, has three distinctive topographies: aham as the ego of the empirical subject, aham as the subject of experience that objectifies the ego, and aham as the ego that embodies the totality. Nemec reiterates the fact that the concept of pūrṇāhantā or the vocabulary to support this concept is absent in (...) Somānanda. Besides Abhinava, I am incorporating later Śākta commentarial texts in this analysis. My justification for giving Abhinava main credit is that he formally established this concept and later commentators primarily expand upon his insights. See also Bäumer. While aham in its most exalted sense relates to the absolute I-consciousness that embraces the totality, it immanently encloses all individualities within its embrace, enveloping all to find a singular identity through its transcendental gaze. Aham in this sense is the “I-am” in which all those within the parameters discover their individuality while also finding collectivity. It is the I-sense that determines or delimits the parameters of the body, and in this sense aham also stands for the embodied self-experience. (shrink)

We argue that the pratyabhijñā system of Kaśmir Śaivism holds an inconsistent position. On the one hand, the Pratyabhijñā regards Śiva as an impersonal mechanism and the universe, including persons, as not having agency; call this the Impersonal Component. On the other hand, it considers Śiva himself as a person, and individual persons as having agency sufficient to respond to Śiva; call this the Personal Component. We maintain that the Personal Component should be affirmed and the Impersonal Component rejected. The (...) Impersonal Component’s claim that Śiva is unaware of and unaffected by his manifestation should be rejected, and the doctrine of satkāryavāda should be modified. The universe is Śiva’s manifestation, in the first instance, but it also has a relative autonomy from him. Moreover, humans have agency and freedom. Their actions effect Śiva. He grows and develops in response to his manifestation. (shrink)

The worship of Śiva as a deity was the dominant form of theistic and religious devotion which flowed through Kashmir to other parts of India from the first century BC. The Trika school is an idealistic, monistic, and theistic school of philosophy in Śaivism, that originated in the ninth century C.E. in Kashmir. The study attempts to elucidate the historical development of Trika school along with the idiosyncratic and unique philosophy of the school. The paper further endeavours to explain the (...) enthralling development of this particular school which can best be understood from a religio-philosophical context. The study employs textual analysis and conceptual enquiry as the research method to analyse and present the development and distinct nature of the Trika school. (shrink)

In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhijñā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him. The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists (...) in mind. In a third phase, Utpaladeva developed in his Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ) a second theory of error, one that involved the noncognition of non-duality ( abhedākhyāti ) and served to explain both the appearance and perception of multiplicity, despite the strict monism to which all Pratyabhijñā authors subscribe. Abhinavagupta’s treatment of error, then, is significant not only because it was meant to explain all the various theories of error offered by opposing philosophical schools, as Rastogi has shown, but more importantly because it synthesized the thinking of his predecessors on the matter in a single, elegant account of error. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that the Śaiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sāṃkhya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sāṃkhya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the Śaiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, (...) in perfect contradiction with the Sāṃkhya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr̥ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other Śaiva sources, including Somānanda’s Śivadr̥ṣṭi and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sāṃkhya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (śakti), and that his criticism of the Sāṃkhya understanding of causality might target the Śaiva dualists as well as Sāṃkhya authors. (shrink)

It is well known that Utpaladeva’s (c. 925–975) articulation of the Pratyabhijñā deviates in style and substance from that of his teacher, Somānanda (fl. c. 900–950), and that the former’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās (along with two auto-commentaries) come to be regarded as the definitive formulation of the school’s philosophy almost from the moment they were first composed. In this essay, I argue that while the spirit and general philosophical contours of Somānanda’s Śivadṛṣṭi serve as the basis for all subsequent writings in the (...) history of the Pratyabhijñā, Somānanda nevertheless articulates a philosophical monism that is both pantheistic and absent in its essentials from Utpaladeva’s oeuvre. This pantheism, I further suggest, stands in contrast to Utpaladeva’s panentheistic monism, which while compatible with Somānanda’s philosophical vision is nevertheless articulated in different terms: Somānanda emphasizes the functioning of Śiva’s power(s), while Utpaladeva articulates a monism based on the identification of paired opposites. In doing so, this essay identifies Somānanda’s unique contributions to the history of the Pratyabhijñā. (shrink)