Neurath’s approach to the problem of the unity of science is different from conceptions we may call traditional, to know, those that consider that what unites in one single concept the diverse sciences is the adoption of a method, or those that defend that this is carried through by certain characteristics which can be found in the body of knowledge considered scientific. Neurath’s stance also diverges from the standpoint that there is no unifying factor for science, that is, the view (...) that the different sciences are only classified under such concept because of the historical origin of such activities. Neurath’s proposal is to consider science as an attitude, a posture in relation to the problems of the world, the scientific world-conception. This text presents such approach in connection to the aspect of social transformation that can be found in Neurath’s thought. This is done following a comprehension of the ideas of the Vienna Circle, seeking to understand a continuity among the ideas of the members of such group, especially Neurath and Carnap. The present text aims, as well, at recovering the Neurathian idea that we can use a philosophical approach to science to struggle against the problems of the world. (shrink)

This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the “logic of science”) supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the “behavioristics of science”). A claim to this effect was recently met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap’s formalist conception of philosophy by the pragmatist Morris, but that (...) this initiative failed and that Carnap showed no interest in it. To defend the original claim this paper provides an analysis of Carnap and Morris on the subject matter of pragmatics in order to show that and how Carnap adopted Morris’s proposals in so far as they agreed with bipartite metatheory conception. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Arne Naess once called himself ?a kind of metaphysician?: did or did he not therewith turn his back on his philosophical mentors in the Vienna Circle? To try to determine the meaning of this self-ascription, this paper first considers in detail two works in which his disagreements with the philosophers of the Vienna Circle found their clearest and most detailed expression. Concentrating on Carnap it will be argued that while some of Naess's criticisms cannot be taken as authoritative, he (...) did indicate a clear dividing line between himself and Carnap. Turning then to Naess's valediction to philosophy of science from 1972, Naess's appreciation of the role of metaphysics for science will be discussed and compared with his appreciation for the role of metaphysics for personal and political life as expressed in his still later ecophilosophy. Once allowance is made for the different needs addressed by his writings for the deep ecology movement and a certain 1960s' rhetoric is discounted as no longer appropriate, it can be seen that Naess's theoretical philosophy exhibited a remarkable continuity throughout. (shrink)