This article aims to discuss Bunge's critique of Popper's falsifiabilism as a criterion for distinguishing science from pseudoscience. First, it provides a historical background to the distinction of science; secondly, it explore Duhem-Quine thesis as an early objection to falsifiability, and thirdly, it discusses Bunge's criticism of falsifiability as all-around false — logically, methodologically, psychologically, and historically; and finally, it provides the criteria of scientificity from Bunge's point of view. في الوقت الذي يتسابق فيه العلماء من أجل الكشف عن علاج (...) لفيروس كورونا (كوفيد-19)، تطل علينا وسائل إعلامية لتقدم بعض الوصفات بوصفها علاجًا مثل الشلولو (ملوخية جافة مع الثوم والليمون والشطة)، والفول، ونحو ذلك، ومهمة فلاسفة العلم هي إعادة النظر من حين إلى آخر في ما يميز العلم من اللاعلم والعلم الزائف. ولعلّ أقل فائدة للفلسفة العلمية هي حمايتنا من هذا من الخداع الفكري. تدور هذه المقالة على ثلاث خطوات، تقدم الأولى خلفية تاريخية لمشكلة تمييز العلم، وتعرض الثانية حلّ بوبر لهذه المشكلة، واعتراض نزعة الكلية عليه، وتعالج الثالثة نقد بونجي لحل بوبر، وتصوره الخاص لمعايير العلم. (shrink)

Sözde-bilim ile ilgili bu tartışmalar uluslararası literatürde yapılıyor olsa da Türkiye’de henüz bu konuların eleştirel olarak ele alındığı söylenemez. Dolayısıyla sözde-bilimlerin eleştirel olarak ele alındığı öğrenme ortamlarının öğrencilerin bilime ve sözde-bilime ilişkin algılarına etkisi üzerine yapılacak araştırmalar konunun daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayabilir ve belki de ilerideki program değişiklerinde öğretim programlarında sözde-bilimin yer bulmasının yolunu açabilir.

Although “theory” has been the prevalent unit of analysis in the meta-study of science throughout most of the twentieth century, the concept remains elusive. I further explore the leitmotiv of several authors in this issue: that we should deal with theorizing (rather than theory) in biology as a cognitive activity that is to be investigated naturalistically. I first contrast how philosophers and biologists have tended to think about theory in the last century or so, and consider recent calls to upgrade (...) the role of theory in the life sciences against the background of the recent “data deluge” in molecular biology, systems biology, etc. I then review thinking about theory in biology in relation to physical theory as a positive or negative exemplar. I conclude by discussing various aspects of a positive program for “naturalizing theorizing.”. (shrink)