Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Simulation Argument: Some Explanations.Nick Bostrom - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):458-461.
    Anthony Brueckner, in a recent article, proffers ‘a new way of thinking about Bostrom's Simulation Argument’ . His comments, however, misconstrue the argument; and some words of explanation are in order.The Simulation Argument purports to show, given some plausible assumptions, that at least one of three propositions is true . Roughly stated, these propositions are: almost all civilizations at our current level of development go extinct before reaching technological maturity; there is a strong convergence among technologically mature civilizations such that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • A Critical Engagement of Bostrom’s Computer Simulation Hypothesis.Norman Swazo - unknown
    In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a computer simulation. Although his argument is structured to include a “hypothesis,” it is unclear that his proposition can be accounted as a properly scientific hypothesis. Here Bostrom’s argument is engaged critically by accounting for philosophical and scientific positions that have implications for Bostrom’s principal thesis. These include discussions from Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Dreyfus that relate to modelling of structures of thinking and computation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism.Jonathan Birch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A Patch for the Simulation Argument.N. Bostrom & M. Kulczycki - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):54-61.
    This article reports on a newly discovered bug in the original simulation argument. Two different ways of patching the argument are proposed, each of which preserves the original conclusion.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Paradox of Idealization.Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):461-469.
    A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known. This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn (1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this article, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique.Paul Franceschi - 2016 - Philosophiques 43 (2):371-389.
    Paul Franceschi | : Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique, fondée sur le problème de la classe de référence. Je décris tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation de manière détaillée. J’identifie ensuite la classe de référence et j’applique successivement l’argument à trois classes de référence distinctes : les simulations conscientes de leur propre nature de simulation, les simulations imparfaites et les simulations à immersion. Finalement, je montre (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What This Means for the Simulation Argument.Claus Beisbart - 2014 - The Monist 97 (3):399-417.
    N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations