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  1. An ineffective antidote for hawkmoths.Roman Frigg & Leonard A. Smith - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-24.
    In recent publications we have drawn attention to the fact that if the dynamics of a model is structurally unstable, then the presence of structural model error places in-principle limits on the model’s ability to generate decision-relevant probability forecasts. Writing with a varying array of co-authors, Eric Winsberg has now produced at least four publications in which he dismisses our points as unfounded; the most recent of these appeared in this journal. In this paper we respond to the arguments of (...)
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  • Conglomerability, Disintegrability and the Comparative Principle.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):479-488.
    Our aim here is to present a result that connects some approaches to justifying countable additivity. This result allows us to better understand the force of a recent argument for countable additivity due to Easwaran. We have two main points. First, Easwaran’s argument in favour of countable additivity should have little persuasive force on those permissive probabilists who have already made their peace with violations of conglomerability. As our result shows, Easwaran’s main premiss – the comparative principle – is strictly (...)
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  • The Gradation Puzzle of Intellectual Assurance.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):488-496.
    The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by (...)
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  • Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):395-414.
    Must probabilities be countably additive? On the one hand, arguably, requiring countable additivity is too restrictive. As de Finetti pointed out, there are situations in which it is reasonable to use merely finitely additive probabilities. On the other hand, countable additivity is fruitful. It can be used to prove deep mathematical theorems that do not follow from finite additivity alone. One of the most philosophically important examples of such a result is the Bayesian convergence to the truth theorem, which says (...)
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