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Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination

Takuya Niikawa

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21 (2023)

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The integration problem for naive realism.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (5):697-716.details This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Off the beaten path: perception in enactivism and the realism-idealism question.Thomas van Es - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.details Where does enactivism fit on the question of realism or idealism for perception? In recent years all general positions have been argued to be adequate. I will argue that enactivism is neither realist nor idealist, and requires a completely different game altogether. In short: it is not idealist because it sees cognition as inherently world-involving, and isn’t realist because it emphasizes the agent’s role in shaping the world through our own historical, bodily activity. More generally, I argue that the question (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites.Ivan V. Ivanov & Arthur Schipper - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.details In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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