This article complements company-level approaches on the explicitization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), zooming out to the national institutional level. We draw on qualitative data collected during several research stays in Japan, a case with a recent uptake of “explicit” CSR, where, historically, companies focused on “implicit” CSR. We present an empirically grounded framework for CSR explicitization at the national institutional level, involving three dimensions of changes: (a) ideas around CSR, (b) modes of evaluation of CSR, and (c) structures of (...) control over CSR. In Japan, this process has been driven by the government, orchestrating these changes. Our framework contextualizes earlier understandings of CSR explicitization, allowing critical examination in relation to socio-political developments and providing the grounds for future comparative analysis of CSR explicitization. Furthermore, we add to the literature on the government-CSR nexus, introducing the notion of ideational steering as a new mode of government orchestration and shedding light on the role of financial market actors as co-regulators of CSR. (shrink)

This research analyzes how family embeddedness affects the decision of owners in charge of small entrepreneurial family firms operating in an emerging country to participate in private-sector corruption. Prior research has typically assumed that those in charge of family firms choose to participate in corruption to receive an immediate economic benefit. We challenge this assumption and argue that family influences the decision of the owner of small entrepreneurial family firms to participate in private-sector corruption driven by the pursuit of both (...) short-term economic (profit maximization) and long-term non-economic goals, including attaining upper social class status (even if this decreases economic gains) for the family unit. We further find that in the context of an emerging market, trusted intermediaries can be seen as family members by the owners in charge of small entrepreneurial family firms and can influence them to participate in illicit activities. We also contend that those in charge of small entrepreneurial family businesses manage participation in private-sector corruption by dissociating and framing means. (shrink)