This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that (...) supports it. (shrink)

Intento criticar en el presente trabajo el enfoque sobre el poder del consentimiento defendido por David Owens. Según este enfoque, la capacidad de consentir responde a un interés normativo característico, el cual consistiría en permitir que ciertas obligaciones personales sean incumplidas, sin importar lo que materialmente se siga de ello, como la transgresión de nuestros intereses no normativos. Aquí sostendré que el enfoque de Owens confundiría dos planos de consideraciones: el plano relativo a la capacidad general de consentir y el (...) plano relativo al ejercicio de dicha capacidad en casos concretos. Para comprender el primer plano, el enfoque puede ser provechoso. No obstante, para comprender el segundo, lo más razonable sería apelar a la idea de razones personales para actuar, una idea que no parece haber recibido suficiente atención en la literatura habitual sobre el consentimiento. (shrink)

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then (...) turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing. (shrink)

According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justifications.

The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the (...) two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state. (shrink)