Kant attempted to answer the question of whether immoral actions result from a mere lack or failing of reason, or whether they consist in a certain form of rationality, i. e. in immoral reasons. The paper addresses this question by concentrating on Kant’s conception of “rationalising” (“Vernünfteln”). This concept is the key for understanding how immoral actions can be based on reasons and are thus imputable. According to Kant, by rationalising, the moral agent constructs a formal coherence of his maxims (...) that pretends to conform with the moral law but actually follows motives such as self-love or self-conceit. This activity of constructing a rational illusion, which derives from a dialectic of reason, can be imputed to the moral agent. Finally, the paper addresses strategies that Kant develops in order to circumvent the rationalising trap. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between Reinhold’s account of free will and Kant’s account in the Religion. This relationship is important because Reinhold considered Kant’s treatment of free will in the Religion to confirm his own view that freedom consists in the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. I argue that despite their shared commitment to freedom as a necessary condition for imputation, these two thinkers have disparate conceptions of the ground for the exercise of free will. (...) This difference indicates difficulties in their respective accounts. (shrink)

K.L. Reinhold defende uma teoria da vontade livre como a capacidade de escolher por e contra a lei moral. A teoria de Reinhold tem sido frequentemente acusada de ser psicologista devido a seu suposto apelo a fatos empíricos da consciência. Este artigo argumenta que, em vez de meramente considerar a vontade livre como um fato da consciência, Reinhold oferece um argumento em favor da vontade livre como uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral. Isso joga nova luz ao desenvolvimento do (...) conceito de vontade no despertar da filosofia prática de Kant. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. (...) The journal "Der Gedanke", the organ of the PGB, reported closely how Kant returned to the spotlight of German philosophy. The reactions of the PGB members to the Kant revival was not only critical. Over the course of the 1860s the interest on Kant among the members grew little by little. (shrink)

A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant’s exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant’s critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood; and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant‘s new conception of theodicy, (...) I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant’s second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of ‘metaphysical evil’, and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant’s claim in this regard. (shrink)