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Epistemically flawless false beliefs

Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309 (2020)

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  1. Similarity in conceptual analysis and concept as proper function.Louis Chartrand - unknown
    In the last decades, experimental philosophers have introduced the notion that conceptual analysis could use empirical evidence to back some of its claims. This opens up the possibility for the development of a corpus-based conceptual analysis. However, progress in this direction is contingent on the development of a proper account of concepts and corpus-based conceptual analysis itself that can be leveraged on textual data. In this essay, I address this problem through the question of similarity: how do we evaluate similarity (...)
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  • Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.
    In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I show that Dular (...)
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  • The false belief: its epistemic and normative characteristics.А. А Шевченко - 2023 - Siberian Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):5-16.
    The article considers lying as an epistemic attitude, analyzes its structural and substantive characteristics. In particular, it considers the pragmatic consequences of using false beliefs, primarily in scientific practice. It is shown that in a number of cases false epistemic attitudes can play a positive role, mainly as temporary hypothetical or counterfactual assumptions, as well as positive illusions. The paper also analyzes two alternative approaches towards false beliefs: “knowledge-first epistemology” of T. Williamson and “action-first epistemology” in line with epistemic pragmatism. (...)
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