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The Move from Is to Good in Environmental Ethics

Environmental Ethics 31 (2):135-154 (2009)

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Is Climate Change Morally Good from Non-Anthropocentric Perspectives?Toby Svoboda & Jacob Haqq-Misra - 2018 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 21 (2):215-228.details Anthropogenic climate change poses some difficult ethical quandaries for non-anthropocentrists. While it is hard to deny that climate change is a substantial moral ill, many types of non-human organisms stand to benefit from climate change. Modelling studies provide evidence that net primary productivity (NPP) could be substantially boosted, both regionally and globally, as a result of warming from increased concentrations of greenhouse gases. The same holds for deployment of certain types of climate engineering, or large-scale, technological modifications of the global (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Is artefactualness a value-relevant property of living things?Ronald Sandler - 2012 - Synthese 185 (1):89-102.details Artefacts are often regarded as being mere things that possess only instrumental value. In contrast, living entities (or some subset of them) are often regarded as possessing some form of intrinsic (or non-instrumental) value. Moreover, in some cases they are thought to possess such value precisely because they are natural (i.e., non-artefactual). However, living artefacts are certainly possible, and they may soon be actual. It is therefore necessary to consider whether such entities should be regarded as mere things (like most (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
The Move from Is to Good in Environmental Ethics.John Nolt - 2009 - Environmental Ethics 31 (2):135-154.details Moves from is to good—that is, principles that link fact to value—are fundamental to environmental ethics. The upshot is fourfold: (1) for nonanthropogenic goods, only those moves from is to good are defensible which conceive goodness as goodness for biotic entities; (2) goodness for nonsentient biotic entities is contribution to their autopoietic functioning; (3) biotic entities also function “exopoietically” to benefit related entities, and these exopoietic benefits are on average greater than their own goods; and (4) the most general is-to-good (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Against etiological function accounts of interests.Katie McShane - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3499-3517.details The etiological account of function defines a part’s/trait’s function as whatever that part/trait does and was selected for doing. Some philosophers have tried to employ this as an account of biological interests, claiming that to benefit an organism is to promote its etiological functioning and to harm it is to inhibit such functioning. I argue that etiological functioning is not a good account of biological interests. I first describe the history of theories of biological interests, explaining the special role that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
An evaluation of the autopoietic account of interests.Stephanie Hoffmann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details Historically, biocentrists have ascribed interests to organisms via an account of function. One promising account of function for this purpose is the organizational or autopoietic account of function, according to which some entity x has a function of self-maintenance when the parts of x contribute to the goal of self-maintenance. In this paper, I will present the autopoietic account of interests and provide some reasons for thinking that this account is promising. I will also present a possible issue for the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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