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Mental causation : ontology and patterns of variation

Paul Noordhof

In Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)

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Emergence, Function and Realization.Umut Baysan - 2018 - In Sophie Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry & Tom Lancaster (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Emergence. New York: Routledge.details “Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
(1 other version)Vertical Versus Horizontal: What is really at issue in the exclusion problem?John Donaldson - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-16.details I outline two ways of reading what is at issue in the exclusion problem faced by non-reductive physicalism, the “vertical” versus “horizontal”, and argue that the vertical reading is to be preferred to the horizontal. I discuss the implications: that those who have pursued solutions to the horizontal reading of the problem have taken a wrong turn. Download Export citation Bookmark
Mental Causation.Sophie Gibb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):327-338.details Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
Rejecting epiphobia.Umut Baysan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2773-2791.details Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
An Argument for Power Inheritance.Umut Baysan - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):pqv126.details Abstract: Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses: (i) realization is a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Realization and Causal Powers.Umut Baysan - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Glasgowdetails In this thesis, I argue that physicalism should be understood to be the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. In doing this, I explore what the realization relation might be. Since realization is the relation that should help us formulate physicalism, I suggest that the theoretical role of realization consists in explaining some of the things that physicalists wish to explain. These are: How are mental properties metaphysically necessitated by physical properties? How are mental properties causally efficacious? (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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