The interesting question about modality is not about its extension, but about its point. Everyone can agree (for instance) that the past is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in some ‘modern’ senses, and that the present is necessary in the Ockhamist sense but not in the Scotist sense. But why should it matter? These comments on Pasnau (2020) first set out a simple-minded explication in modern terms of some of these fourteenth-century ideas. Then I take issue with (a) (...) Pasnau’s claim that the necessity of the past has something to do with the structure of ‘narrative history’, and (b) Duns Scotus’s claim that the contingency of the present has something to do with human freedom. (shrink)

I first examine John Duns Scotus’ view of contingency, pure possibility, and created possibilities, and his version of the celebrated distinction between ordained and absolute power. Scotus’ views on ethical natural law and his account of induction are characterised, and their dependence on the preceding doctrines detailed. I argue that there is an inconsistency in his treatments of the problem of induction and ethical natural law. Both proceed with God’s contingently willed creation of a given order of laws, which can (...) be revoked and replaced with a new order of laws. In the case of ethical natural law God promulgated the Decalogue, for example; in the case of nature, there are physical laws that can be known by induction. Scotus exalts the freedom of God and the mutability of ethical natural law in order to explain exceptions to it disclosed by revelation (for example, the Old Testament command to Abraham to kill Isaac). Yet he treats ethical natural laws as (mostly) not universal and immutable. In contrast, he holds that we can arrive at knowledge of the universal and immutable laws of nature, except for those regularities that result from free will. Finally, I present several ways of characterising this tension between Scotus’ doctrines. (shrink)

This article highlights five areas of Scotus’ philosophy that have recently been the subject of scholarly discussion. (1) Metaphysics: I outline the most current accounts of Scotus on individuation (thisness or haecceity) and the common nature. (2) Modal theory: I consider recent accounts both of Scotus’ innovations in spelling out the notion of the logically (and broadly logically) possible, and of his account of the independence of modality. (3) Cognitive psychology: I examine recent views of Scotus’ theory of intentionality and (...) the nature of mental content. (4) Semantics: I look at contemporary expositions of Scotus’ view that words signify things. (5) Metaethics and ethics: I briefly describe conflicting interpretations of Scotus’ metaethics, and discuss whether Scotus should be thought of as adopting some kind of divine‐command theory or not. I note too Scotus’ claim that virtues and passions can be located in the will. (shrink)