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Hume's Moral Ontology

Hume Studies 1985 (1):189-214 (1985)

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  1. Sobre a natureza da teoria moral de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2006 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 47 (113):131-146.
    RESUMO -/- Este artigo discute duas variedades de interpretação para a teoria moral de Hume. De um lado, ela é representada como uma forma de subjetivismo e, de outro, como uma forma de realismo. Ao final, é proposto que esta filosofia pode ser melhor descrita como uma forma de intersubjetivismo. -/- ABSTRACT -/- This paper discusses two varieties of interpretations of Hume's moral theory. On the one side the attempt to represent Hume's moral theory as a form of the moral (...)
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  • Passionate objectivity.Corliss G. Swain - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):465-490.
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  • Hume's metaethical cognitivism and the natural law theory.Bernd Graefrath - 1991 - Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1):73-79.
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  • A Humean approach to assessing the moral significance of ultra-violent video games.Monique Wonderly - 2008 - Ethics and Information Technology 10 (1):1-10.
    Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume's moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics: the moral (...)
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  • Le projectivisme humien et ses implications métaéthiques.Samuel Lépine - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 112 (4):525-544.
    Hume recourt régulièrement à la métaphore selon laquelle nous projetons des valeurs sur le monde du fait des émotions que nous éprouvons. Cette métaphore projectiviste semble impliquer la non-existence des valeurs, et l’impossibilité d’une connaissance morale. Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que ces implications sont loin d’être évidentes, et qu’une lecture réaliste de Hume est également possible, qui permet notamment de rendre compte du rapport complexe que Hume entretient avec le rationalisme moral en particulier, et avec la connaissance des (...)
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