In The Disavowed Community, Jean-Luc Nancy presents a critique of his seminal 1983 essay “The Inoperative Community.” According to Nancy, his error in attempting to derive a politics from Maurice Blanchot’s concept of unworking lay in conflating politics and ontology. This paper suggests that Nancy’s self-critique is only partially correct. The problem ultimately resides in the theory of unworking itself, I argue, not its misapplication. In pursuing this contention, I trace out the tacit response to the exchange between Nancy and (...) Blanchot developed in Jacques Rancière’s early writings on aesthetics. Rancière’s turn to aesthetics is best understood, I propose, as an intended corrective to Blanchot’s influence on post-Marxist theory. Focusing on Rancière’s critiques of Blanchot in Mallarmé: Politics of the Siren and Mute Speech, I show how Rancière’s rival account of modern art answers the question of non-identitarian left politics that Nancy posed in “The Inoperative Community.”. (shrink)

This essay explores the notion of the ‘event’ and it relevance to ethnography and community. It has developed from research work with Aboriginal people, especially the Jackman family, in central Western Australia. The essay sketches the possibility of developing another kind of ethnographic writing, one attuned to the relation with others, one that involves being-in-common with others. It focuses on developing a writing practice that is exposed to interruption, to fragments, to little happenings and encounters, to those shared events that (...) happen in community. The essay sees community as the place of interruption: that to be with others is to be taken off, shown something else, exposed to unique turnings of the world that others give light to trace. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy identifies Rousseau as the first to conceive community as a lost state of immediacy and transparency. Rousseau’s conception has allegedly shaped the western ideal of an immanent community. Nancy deconstructs that ideal, arguing that immanence would suppress community; its oneness would block the being-with which enables our ontological being-in-common. This article argues that Rousseau never posits a lost community but actually explores, like Nancy, the political closure of immanence. Man’s distinguishing trait of perfectibility, which renders him finite, always (...) open to change for better or worse, rejects the self-enclosure of immanence as does the constant willing of the general will which defines a community’s political life. If citizens could form an immanent whole, they would have nothing left to will, reaching an inhuman situation without liberty, reflection and responsibility. A community’s vitality, as Rousseau’s discussion of Poland suggests, does not come from closure to th.. (shrink)

: In the Aristotelian tradition, politics is a matter of public deliberation over questions of justice and injustice. The Bush administration's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been uniformly hostile to this notion, and it has instead promoted a jingoistic politics of self‐assertion by an America largely identified with the executive branch of its government. This is doubly disturbing, as the executive branch has sought to free itself from international law, multinational commitments, and domestic judicial regulation, (...) even as it has sought to validate itself by demonizing its enemies. This essay draws out the disturbing echoes here of Carl Schmitt's work of the 1920s, in particular of Schmitt's conception of the sovereign as the ungrounded ground of the law and the political as the site of mortal conflict between friend and enemy. The essay argues that Schmitt's position in the twenties, for all of its evident problems, is superior to that of Bush, Wolfowitz, and Ashcroft in at least two senses: Schmitt condemns the idea of waging war for profit and recognizes that such wars will often be disguised as moral crusades waged against the “inhuman”; and he acknowledges that claiming to fight a war for humanity denies one's enemies their humanity, leaving them open to torture and even extermination. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian tradition, politics is a matter of public deliberation over questions of justice and injustice. The Bush administration's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been uniformly hostile to this notion, and it has instead promoted a jingoistic politics of self‐assertion by an America largely identified with the executive branch of its government. This is doubly disturbing, as the executive branch has sought to free itself from international law, multinational commitments, and domestic judicial regulation, even (...) as it has sought to validate itself by demonizing its enemies. This essay draws out the disturbing echoes here of Carl Schmitt's work of the 1920s, in particular of Schmitt's conception of the sovereign as the ungrounded ground of the law and the political as the site of mortal conflict between friend and enemy. The essay argues that Schmitt's position in the twenties, for all of its evident problems, is superior to that of Bush, Wolfowitz, and Ashcroft in at least two senses: Schmitt condemns the idea of waging war for profit and recognizes that such wars will often be disguised as moral crusades waged against the “inhuman”; and he acknowledges that claiming to fight a war for humanity denies one's enemies their humanity, leaving them open to torture and even extermination. (shrink)