Particularism is widely conceived to endorse the view that moral reason is context-dependent. This being so, it is often accused of flattening the moral landscape—treating the feature of promise-keeping as constituting no more of a (moral) reason for action than the feature of wearing a yellow shoelace in advance of the considerations of the contexts. In reply, Dancy maintains that his particularism allows some features such as promise-keeping to have a reason status by default, ontologically speaking; it is just that (...) their default reason status might get ‘switched off’ in some contexts. In this paper, I will argue that Dancy's ontological understanding of default reason wouldn't help the particularists address the flattening objection, due to a violation of what Tsu calls ‘the embedded thesis’, which is a general constraint on how moral reason behaves. However, once the nature of default reason is correctly understood as psychological, particularism will be enabled to deflate the flattening objection, or so I will argue. (shrink)