* Este texto hizo parte de una conferencia que se ofreció en el X Congreso Nacional de Filosofía de Argentina, celebrado en Huerta Grande (Córdoba) entre el 24 y el 27 de noviembre de 1999. Una versión abreviada ha sido publicada en las pp. 74-76 de Actas de X Congreso Nacional de Filosofía. Asociación Filosófica Argentina AFRA y Escuela de Filosofía, Universidad Nacional..

Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality (...) with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism. (shrink)