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  1. Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (1):18-28.
    Jean Buridan has offered a solution to the Liar Paradox, i.e. to the problem of assigning a truth-value to the sentence ‘What I am saying is false’. It has been argued that either this solution is ad hoc since it would only apply to self-referencing sentences [Read, S. 2002. ‘The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine’, Vivarium, 40 , 189–218] or else it weakens his theory of truth, making his ‘a logic without truth’ [Klima, G. 2008. ‘Logic (...)
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  • (1 other version)Insolubles.Paul Vincent Spade - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Implied-Meaning Analysis of the Currian Conditional.Miroslav Hanke - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (4):367 - 380.
    Expanding on the recent research of Stephen Read and Catarina Dutilh Novaes concerning Thomas Bradwardine's theory of truth, the present paper makes an effort to analyse the Currian conditional in terms of the so-called ?Bradwardine principle?, i.e. the principle that meaning is closed under entailment. Based upon two possible applications of this approach, alternative solutions to the issues of semantic pathology and trivialisation of deductive systems are presented.
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  • Truth and Falsity in Buridan’s Bridge.Paul Égré - 2023 - Synthese 201 (1):1-22.
    This paper revisits Buridan’s Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine’s Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in Cervantes’s Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions to the problem, namely Bradwardine’s “just false” conception, Buridan’s “contingently true/false” theory, Cervantes’s “both true and false” view, and then the “neither true simpliciter nor false simpliciter” account proposed more recently by Jacquette. All have in (...)
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  • Field's Paradox and Its Medieval Solution.Stephen Read - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2):161-176.
    Hartry Field's revised logic for the theory of truth in his new book, Saving Truth from Paradox , seeking to preserve Tarski's T-scheme, does not admit a full theory of negation. In response, Crispin Wright proposed that the negation of a proposition is the proposition saying that some proposition inconsistent with the first is true. For this to work, we have to show that this proposition is entailed by any proposition incompatible with the first, that is, that it is the (...)
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