The article refers to a long-standing dispute over the relations between the two orders of study of Plato’s dialogues in the Prologue of Albinus (Ch. V and Ch. VI, respectively). The dominant solu- tions are identified: 1) the acceptance of the first curriculum as «for amateurs» and the second curriculum as «for professional platonists» (J. Freudenthal, O. Nüsser, J. Mansfeld); 2) the treat- ment of the first course as a short introduction to the second (B. Reis). On the grounds of (...) the obvious weaknesses of both positions and the lack of textual evidence, a change of perspective is suggested. The author argues that there was no need to coordinate these curricula, since the second curriculum was the only one that Albinus promoted, and the first, which focused on a non-exist- ent «ideal student», served as a «model». In addition, the author proves that Albinus did not offer for study the entire Plato’s dialogues, but only seven of these dialogues in the 5 stages of the second curriculum. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral disagreement and widespread moral bias pose a serious problem for moral intuitionism. Seneca’s view that we just recognise the good could be criticised using a similar argument. His approach to argumentation offers a way out, one that may serve as a model for a revisionary intuitionism.