The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical (...) connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce frequently mentioned reading Richard Whately's Elements of Logic when he was 12 years old. Throughout his life, Peirce emphasized the importance of that experience. This valorization of Whately is puzzling at first. Early in his career Peirce rejected Whately's central logical doctrines. What valuable insight concerning logic was robust enough to survive these specific rejections? Peirce recommended a biographical approach to understanding his philosophy. This essay follows that suggestion by considering Peirce's reading of Whately in a larger (...) life context. Surprisingly many factors in Charles Peirce's personal and intellectual development were at play when he read Whately. His father, Benjamin Peirce, oversaw rigorous home schooling intended to train young Charley for a brilliant intellectual career. Laboratory experience with qualitative chemical analysis exposed the boy to the logic of scientific investigation, specifically to the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry. However, tensions between father and son developed over Charles' wish to devote his life to studying the logic of science. The two also disagreed upon the value of formal science. Against this background we will review relevant logical doctrines of Whately's book, as well as his innovative formalizing practice of logical inquiry. Then we will see that it was Whately's lessons about formal science that were of such importance to Peirce. (shrink)

This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can capture all the different ways in which a (...) possibility can occur. Mental models share these properties. But, as the graphs show, certain aspects of propositions cannot be represented in an iconic or visualisable way. They include negation, and the representation of possibilities qua possibilities, which both require representations that do not depend on a perceptual modality. Peirce took his graphs to reveal the fundamental operations of reasoning, and the paper concludes with an analysis of different hypotheses about these operations. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce argued that, besides deduction and induction, there is a third mode of inference which he called " hypothesis " or " abduction." He characterized abduction as reasoning " from effect to cause," and as " the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis." Peirce ' s ideas about abduction, which are related also to historically earlier accounts of heuristic reasoning, have been seen as providing a logic of scientific discovery. Alternatively, abduction is interpreted as giving reasons for pursuing (...) a hypothesis. Inference to the best explanation has also been regarded as an important mode of justification, both in everyday life, detective stories, and science. In particular, scientific realism has been defended by an abductive nomiracle argument, while the critics of realism have attempted to show that this appeal to abduction is question - begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper approaches these issues by distinguishing weaker and stronger forms of abduction, and by showing how these types of inferences can be given Peircean and Bayesian probabilistic reconstructions. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Grace A. de Laguna’s theory of universals in its historical context and in relation to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics. I explain the central features of her theory, arguing that her theory should be classified as a form of immanent realism and as a powers ontology. I then show in what ways her theory affords a theory of modality in terms of potentialities and discuss some of its consequences along the way.

The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical (...) connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it. (shrink)

When Alain Locke developed a philosophy of valuation that he termed “functional relativism,” he contrasted his position to “value realism,” apparently because he wanted to keep valuations free from being bound to status quo existence. This article considers Locke's philosophy of valuation in relation to the “realism” of Charles S. Peirce in order to show that there is an approach to realism that answers to requirements of dynamic, evolutionary growth and creativity. The argument begins by placing Locke's cardinal values onto (...) a compass-like diagram inspired by Black Elk's ritual acknowledgment of cardinal directions. The illustration of a hoop of valuation is used to explore the usefulness of thinking in terms of diagrams, with explicit reference to Peircean semiotics. Next the article pursues a context of valuation developed through the psychical philosophy of George Herbert Mead and recent work on Peircean realism. It shows how valuation may be viewed as an exercise in freedom, not confined to status quo existence. Sources of error are acknowledged and reviewed. In the end, Peirce's choice of realism versus nominalism is found to be consistent with Lockean commitments to shared living in communities of inquiry. A Lockean philosophy of valuation, therefore, is not necessarily antirealist. (shrink)

We suggest that, far from establishing an inconsistency in the standard theory of the geometrical linear continuum, Zeno’s Paradox of Extension merely establishes an inconsistency between the standard theory of geometrical magnitude and a misguided system of length measurement. We further suggest that our resolution of Zeno’s paradox is superior to Adolf Grünbaum’s now standard resolution based on Lebesgue measure theory.

Детермінізм постає як ключове поняття для науки від моменту її виникнення: наука покликана чітко і однозначно визначати причини явищ, які спостерігаються, та на цій основі впевнено прогнозувати розвиток цих явищ. Втім, вже понад століття, після виникнення квантової фізики та з формулюванням теорії відносності і принципу невизначеності класичне розуміння детермінізму зазнало суттєвого перегляду у фізиці, яка вважалася зразком науки. Ще більше викликів поняття детермінізму отримало у соціальних та гуманітарних науках, які звертаються до об’єктів, які не можуть повністю бути охоплені людським досвідом (...) і бути перевіреними за допомогою експериментів. Водночас, саме до соціальних і гуманітарних наук все більшою мірою звертаються за відповідями на питання, яким буде ближче суспільне майбутнє і як підготуватися до його викликів. Все це зумовило необхідність уточнення, до якої міри саме поняття детермінізму зберегло для науки свою значущість, а також прояснити сучасне розуміння пов’язаних з ним понять, таких як причиновість, індетермінізм, невизначеність тощо. Важливі, і до сьогодні належним чином не осмислені ідеї і проблеми були сформульовані у класичних працях видатних представників природничих та гуманітарних наук, зокрема, таких як фізик Вернер Гейзенберг та історик і соціолог Реймонд Арон. З розвитком науки концепція каузальності лише ускладнюється і розвивається як теоретичне обґрунтування відносин причинності, детермінізму і взаємозалежності, і водночас як наближена модель причинності як об’єктивного і закономірного взаємозв’язку речей, процесів і явищ. Окремим завданням науки постає здійснювати публічне роз’яснення сутнісних змін у концепції наукового детермінізму як припущення щодо можливих стійких повторюваних зв’язків, без якого, щоправда, неможлива наукова чи навіть квазінаукова систематизація знання. (shrink)

This article casts in high relief the paradigmatic rigidity in strategy research by highlighting the underlying philosophical assumptions (ontological, epistemological, methodological), their advantages, and their limitations. The article discusses four philosophical paradigms that underpin strategy research. While positivism and constructivism are the dominant paradigms, critical realism and pragmatism as relevant philosophical perspectives are also discussed. Using entrepreneurial opportunity as an exemplar, the article explains how philosophical assumptions inform the researchers’ worldview and guide research within a paradigm. The article contends that (...) paradigmatic dogmatism is undesirable in any discipline, more so in a relatively young discipline such as strategic management. Rather than adhering to and nestling inside a single metatheoretical paradigm, the article calls for a more reflexive philosophical approach in strategy research to gain fresh perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish between illustrative and performative uses of artworks in the teaching and communication of philosophy, drawing examples from the history of art and my own practice. The former are where works are used merely to illustrate and communicate a philosophical idea or argument, the latter are where the artist or teacher philosophizes through the creation of art. I hope to promote future collaboration between philosophers, art historians and artists, with artworks becoming catalysts for artistic-philosophical investigation, thus (...) revitalizing the idea of universities embodying ongoing and open-ended conversations. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 205 Seiten: 37-86.

An agent-centered, goal-directed, resource-bound logic of human reasoning would do well to note that individual cognitive agency is typified by the comparative scantness of available cognitive resources—information, time, and computational capacity, to name just three. This motivates individual agents to set their cognitive agendas proportionately, that is, in ways that carry some prospect of success with the resources on which they are able to draw. It also puts a premium on cognitive strategies which make economical use of those resources. These (...) latter I callscant-resource adjustment strategies,and they supply the context for an analysis of abduction. The analysis is Peircian in tone, especially in the emphasis it places on abduction’signorance-preservingcharacter. My principal purpose here is to tie abduction’s scarce-resource adjustment capacity to its ignorance preservation. (shrink)

According to Peirce one of the most important philosophical problems is continuity. Consequently, he set forth an innovative and peculiar approach in order to elucidate at once its mathematical and metaphysical challenges through proper non-classical logical reasoning. I will restrain my argument to the definition of the different types of discrete collections according to Peirce, with a special regard to the phenomenon called ?premonition of continuity? (Peirce, 1976, Vol. 3, p. 87, c. 1897).