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Objective Double Effect and the Avoidance of Narcissism

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-286 (2013)

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  1. Intentions, Permissibility, and Choice.Anton Markoč - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (4):493-508.
    T. M. Scanlon has argued that the intentions with which one acts, or more specifically, one’s reasons for acting, are non-derivatively irrelevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions. According to one of his arguments in favor of that thesis, it can be permissible to act for one reason rather than another only if one can choose to act for a reason but, since that choice is impossible since believing as will is impossible, one can be permitted to act but (...)
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