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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Can a Robot Be a Good Colleague?
Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2169-2188 (2020)
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Can nonhuman animals and artificial intelligence (AI) entities be attributed moral agency? The general assumption in the philosophical literature is that moral agency applies exclusively to humans since they alone possess free will or capacities required for deliberate reflection. Consequently, only humans have been taken to be eligible for ascriptions of moral responsibility in terms of, for instance, blame or praise, moral criticism, or attributions of vice and virtue. Animals and machines may cause harm, but they cannot be appropriately ascribed (...) |
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Remote work, understood here as a working environment different from the traditional office working space, is a phenomenon that has existed for many years. In the past, workers voluntarily opted, when they were allowed to, to work remotely rather than commuting to their traditional work environment. However, with the emergence of the global pandemic (corona virus-COVID-19), people were forced to work remotely to mitigate the spread of the virus. Consequently, researchers have identified some benefits and adverse effects of remote work, (...) |
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John Danaher and Sven Nyholm have argued that automation, especially of the sort powered by artificial intelligence, poses a threat to meaningful work by diminishing the chances for meaning-conferring workplace achievement, what they call “achievement gaps”. In this paper, I argue that Danaher and Nyholm’s achievement gap thesis suffers from an ambiguity. The weak version of the thesis holds that automation may result in the appearance of achievement gaps, whereas the strong version holds that automation may result on balance loss (...) |
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In this paper, we discuss the relation between recent philosophical discussions about meaning in life (from authors like Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, and others) and the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI). Our goal is twofold, namely, to argue that considering the axiological category of meaningfulness can enrich AI ethics, on the one hand, and to portray and evaluate the small, but growing literature that already exists on the relation between meaning in life and AI ethics, on the other hand. We (...) |
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Philosophers have not paid much attention to the impact of remote work on the nature of work and the workplace. The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to further debate over the value of remote work by focusing on one important dimension of it – the effect on collegial relationships.I distinguish two types of collegial relationships. On the one hand, there are what I call “Kantian collegial relationships”, which have been outlined in a recent account by Betzler & (...) |
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Using robots in the military contexts is problematic at many levels. There are social, legal, and ethical issues that should be discussed first before their wider deployment. In this paper, we focus on an additional problem: their human likeness. We claim that military robots should not look like humans. That design choice may bring additional risks that endanger human lives and by that contradicts the very justification for deploying robots at war, which is decreasing human deaths and injuries. We discuss (...) |
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We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral (...) |
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