Switch to: References

Citations of:

Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics

New York: Routledge. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander (1995)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Divine Perfection and Creation.R. T. Mullins - 2016 - Heythrop Journal 57 (1):122-134.
    Proclus (c.412-485) once offered an argument that Christians took to stand against the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo based on the eternity of the world and God’s perfection. John Philoponus (c.490-570) objected to this on various grounds. Part of this discussion can shed light on contemporary issues in philosophical theology on divine perfection and creation. First I will examine Proclus’ dilemma and John Philoponus’ response. I will argue that Philoponus’ fails to rebut Proclus’ dilemma. The problem is that presentism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Foreknowledge Without Determinism.Nathan Rockwood - 2019 - Sophia 58 (2):103-113.
    A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Fate, freedom and contingency.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):79-102.
    Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark