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Two Worlds and Two Aspects: on Kant’s Distinction between Things in Themselves and Appearances

Michael Oberst

Kantian Review 20 (1):53-75 (2015)

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‘Ordered and Placed in a Certain Form’: Kant on the Spatiality of Sensation.Tim Jankowiak - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3):418-446.details Kant claims repeatedly that experience involves sensations being ‘ordered and placed’ in space. This paper considers what this surprising claim could possibly mean. After presenting the relevant textual evidence and rejecting two candidate interpretations of it, I defend a qualia or ‘mental paint’ interpretation, according to which experience involves a direct, conscious ‘acquaintance’ with sensations arrayed in a ‘phenomenal space.’ This interpretation allows us to take literally many of Kant's claims about sensation: that it is the matter of both intuition (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Thing and Object: Towards an Ecumenical Reading of Kant’s Idealism.Nicholas Stang - 2022 - In Schafer Karl & Stang Nicholas (eds.), The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds: New Essays on Kant's Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxforrd University Press. pp. 293–336.details I begin by considering a question that has driven much scholarship on transcendental idealism: are appearances numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear, or numerically distinct? I point out that much of the debate on this question has assumed that this is equivalent to the question of whether they are the same objects, but go on to provide textual, historical, and philosophical evidence that “object” (Gegenstand) and “thing” (Ding) have different meanings for Kant. A thing is a locus (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Kant's Neglected Alternative: Neither Neglected nor an Alternative.Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (1):69–90.details This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Darwinism as the Missing Link in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.Igor K. Kalinin - 2019 - Kantian Journal 38 (4):51-80.details I proceed from the hypothesis that the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of his plan and, accordingly, the implicit reason for the critical attitude to this plan on the part of many contemporary philosophers stem from the fact that he had no theoretical link at his disposal which would offer a more solid scientific grounding for his entire system. I believe that Darwinism is such a link which bolsters the central but ungrounded thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason on the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Bounds of Transcendental Logic.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - London: Palgrave Macmillan.details The book addresses two main areas of Kant’s theoretical philosophy: the doctrine of transcendental idealism and various central aspects of the arguments from the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, as well as the relation between the deduction argument and idealism. -/- Among the topics covered are the nature of objective validity, the role and function of transcendental logic in relation to general or formal logic, the possibility of contradictory thoughts, the meaning of the Leitfaden at A79 and the unity of cognition, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism.Michael Oberst - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (2):172-201.details This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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