Contemporary arguments concerning the permissibility of physician-assisted suicide [PAS], or suicide in general, often rehearse classical arguments over whether individual persons have a fundamental right based on autonomy to determine their own death, or whether the community has a legitimate interest in individual members’ welfare that would prohibit suicide. I explicate historical arguments pertaining to PAS aligned with these poles. I contend that an ethical indictment of PAS entails moral duties on the part of one’s community to provide effective means (...) of ameliorating physical and existential suffering. I further elucidate how such duties have been affirmed by the Roman Catholic Church. My aim is to provide reasons why the expanding legalization of PAS should not preclude social investment in effective palliative care and providing a communal presence to the dying as they confront their subjectively experienced suffering. (shrink)

This article explores enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment in reference to modern medicine’s view of the body. Before considering Weber’s enchantment paradigm, I question some core assumptions regarding sociology as methodologically scientific and value-free. Furthermore, I draw on Jenkins who helps to illustrate the difficulty of rooting terms such as enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment; the question remains “which” historical and cultural period is employed as the basis for such sociological terms. Such questions are critical, but not entirely dismissive of modern medicine (...) as “disenchanted”; with some more explicit foundational and presuppositional context, disenchantment can be a helpful notion for approaching questions of the “new body.” St. Gregory Palamas’ Christian materialism and mystical anthropology present such an explicit foundation. Moreover, this Patristic foundation moves past the postmodern aporia of emphasizing either immanence or transcendence—two polar attractions that factor heavily in the way modern medicine views the body. (shrink)

For most of the past generation, clinicians have been taught to treat patients' pain until the patient says it is relieved. The opioid crisis has forced both clinicians and patients to reconsider that approach. This essay considers how Christians in particular might assume and seek to overcome their experiences of persistent pain. Wise and faithful responses to pain, especially chronic pain, can take their bearings from how early Christians made sense of the place of both medicine and suffering in a (...) faithful life. This results in not asking medicine to resolve persistent pain, especially not through the use of opioids. Resisting the impulse to medicalize chronic pain will require patience on the part of those who suffer, and both patience and fortitude on the part of the clinicians to whom they present. (shrink)

In essays written throughout his career, Stanley Hauerwas has unfolded a Christian vision of the marriage bond and the presence of children that seeks insistently to place these seemingly natural bonds within the new family of God that is the church. I examine his understanding, aiming to appreciate the Christian vision displayed while also suggesting that his emphasis on the new thing God does in the church is sometimes allowed to absorb and thereby lose the distinctive significance of the created (...) bonds of marriage and family. (shrink)

Following the revival of virtue theory, some moral theorists have argued that virtue ethics can provide the basis for a radical politics. Such a politics essentially departs from the liberal model of the moral agent as an autonomous reason-giver. It instead privileges an understanding of the agent as conditioned by her community, and in the case of social oppression and marginalization, communal virtues may become a vehicle for social change. This essay compares political appropriations of virtue theory by Christian theologian (...) Stanley Hauerwas and secular feminist thinkers Lisa Tessman and Margaret Urban Walker. Hauerwas and feminist theorists both embrace a kind of embodied vulnerability as a political virtue, arguing that it enables more genuine social recognition. The virtue feminist critique is more robust than Hauerwas's, however, insofar as it understands mutual recognition to involve acknowledgment of social difference and the concomitant pursuit of justice. (shrink)

This essay examines the interconnected nature of salvation and health, and it does so by engaging both recent qualitative research and three scriptural accounts from the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. In doing so, the essay argues that salvation and health—and their conceptual pairings, sin and disease—are never individualistic. These realities are always cosmic, communal, and interpersonal, even as sin and disease are fundamentally disintegrating and isolating. The salvation and health of people suffering with substance use issues are bound (...) up with the transformations of governing principalities and powers, social realities, and relationships. Health care practitioners and clergy should be wise, communal guides offering care and accompaniment in the pursuit of salvation and health. (shrink)

This piece brings into critical conversation Christian resurrection hope, virtual versions of transhumanism, and intellectual disability and demonstrates that Christian resurrection provides a more cogent hope for people with severe intellectual disabilities than transhumanism. I argue that transhumanist virtual futures are theologically problematic, as bodily resurrection is neither required nor desirable. It is particularly problematic for people with severe intellectual disabilities given the way they would be excluded from these futures. Disability theology also raises issues with the traditional notions of (...) “healing” in the resurrection and the implications for the value and identity of persons with intellectual disabilities. Starting with these problems, I explore the nature of Christian hope, noting the inadequacies of a virtual transhumanist future with respect to both resurrection faith and intellectual disability, and address how resurrection hope can account for issues raised in disability theology, and so properly include people with intellectual disabilities. (shrink)

This article argues that while the presence and influence of “futility” as a concept in medical decision-making has declined over the past decade, medicine is seeing the rise of a new concept with similar features: suffering. Like futility, suffering may appear to have a consistent meaning, but in actuality, the concept is colloquially invoked to refer to very different experiences. Like “futility,” claims of patient “suffering” have been used (perhaps sometimes consciously, but most often unconsciously) to smuggle value judgments about (...) quality of life into decision-making. And like “futility,” it would behoove us to recognize the need for new, clearer terminology. This article will focus specifically on secondhand claims of patient suffering in pediatrics, but the conclusions could be similarly applied to medical decisions for adults being made by surrogate decision-makers. While I will argue that suffering, like futility, is not sufficient wholesale justification for making unilateral treatment decisions, I will also argue that claims of patient suffering cannot be ignored, and that they almost always deserve some kind of response. In the final section, I offer practical suggestions for how to respond to claims of patient suffering. (shrink)

Responding to Max Weber’s modern diagnosis of nature, science, and medicine as disenchanted, this article aims to reenvision nature and medicine with a sense of enchantment drawing from the Christian themes of creation, Christology, suffering, and redemption. By reenvisioning nature as enchanted with these theological themes, the vocation of medicine might be revitalized in terms of suffering presence, healing care, and works of mercy toward the neighbor in need.

What is Christian about Christian bioethics? The short answer to this question is that the Incarnation should shape the form and content of Christian bioethics. In explicating this answer it is argued that contemporary medicine is unwittingly embracing and implementing the transhumanist dream of transforming humans into posthumans. Contemporary medicine does not admit that there are any limits in principle to the extent to which it should intervene to improve the quality of human life. This largely inarticulate, yet ambitious, agenda (...) is derived first in late modernity's failed, but nonetheless ongoing, attempt to transform necessity into goodness, and second the loss of any viable concept of eternity, thereby stripping temporal existence of any normative significance. In short, medicine has become the vanguard of a profane attempt to save humankind by extracting data from flesh. In response, it is contended that an alternative Christian bioethics must be shaped by the Incarnation, the Word made flesh. This assertion does not entitle Christians to oppose the posthuman trajectory of contemporary medicine on the basis of any natural or biological essentialism. Rather, it is an evangelical witness to the grace of Christ's redemption instead of the work of self-transformation. It is Christ alone who thereby makes the vulnerability and mortality of finitude a gift and blessing. Specifically, it is maintained that the chasm separating necessity and goodness cannot be filled but only bridged through the suffering entailed in Christ's cross, and through Christ's resurrection eternity becomes the standard against which the temporal lives of human creatures are properly formed and measured. Consequently, Christian bioethics should help us become conformed to Christ rather than enabling selftransformation. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to show why pediatric suffering must be understood as a judgment or evaluation, rather than a mental state. To accomplish this task, first I analyze the various ways that the label of suffering is used in pediatric practice. Out of this analysis emerge what I call the twin poles of pediatric suffering. At one pole sits the belief that infants and children with severe cognitive impairment cannot suffer because they are nonverbal or lack subjective life (...) experience. At the other pole exists the idea that once child suffering reaches some threshold it is ethical to eliminate the sufferer. Concerningly, at both poles, any particular child vanishes from view. Second, in an attempt to identify a theory of suffering inclusive of children, I examine two prominent so-called experiential accounts of suffering. I find them both wanting on account of their absurd entailments and their flawed assumptions regarding the subjective experiences of people who cannot communicate expressively. Finally, I extend arguments found in Alastair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals to argue that child suffering can be understood only as a set of absences—absences of conditions such as love, warmth, and freedom from pain. An evaluation of these absences reveals the exquisite dependency of children. It also discloses why pediatric suffering is necessarily a social and political event. Unlike adults, children will never be either the authors or the mitigators of their own suffering. Rather, children must rely wholly on others in order to resist suffering, grow, and flourish. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne of the most powerful claims of disability theology is that the rejection of persons with disabilities somehow correlates with a rejection of God. This ‘correlative rejection’ is, however, frequently just stated rather than explored in detail, something this article therefore seeks to remedy by examining one example of the correlative rejection that draws together the ethical concerns of theologians writing on intellectual disability with Meister Eckhart’s teaching on the human relationship with God. Here, the correlative rejection is exposed as (...) an inevitable result of the narrow emphasis on autonomy and rationality in human self-perception which shape the habituated, even ritualised ways that we try to know persons with intellectual disabilities and God. By contrast, truly knowing and relating to persons with intellectual disabilities, God, and finally also ourselves, relies on a reconciliation with the dependence, vulnerability, and non-rational forms of exchange that a narrow attachment to a... (shrink)

To set medicine within the context of a good or faithful life requires virtues that give physicians and patients the skills to understand and practice the kind of care medicine is capable of giving. We begin with a prayer that names some of these virtues. We then show how the language of medicine impedes these virtues by fostering the illusion that medicine will free us from illness and mortality. While Aristotle’s account of virtue and happiness seems capable of telling us (...) how to live with finitude, Jonathan Lear shows how it involves another fantasy of escape from it. We then show how Karl Barth’s account of health offers physicians and patients a language by which both the capabilities and the limitations of medicine may serve rather than undermine a good life. 1. (shrink)

When physicians today appeal to “conscience,” it has been alleged such exercises pejoratively reflect “conscience without consequence” as contemporary practitioners are said to be insulated from the consequences of such decisions. It has also been implied these physicians avoid traditional professional responsibilities—including providing charity care and making house or night calls. The assertions demand clarification. Fundamentally, what traits constitute an integrated professionalism specific to Christian physicians? Historical evidence verifies sanctity-of-life affirmations by Christian physicians throughout Church history. However, surveying Christian medical (...) practices in the initial centuries of the Common Era, and more recently in the United States, supports integration of conscience with philanthropy and a rigorous definition of a medical vocation. These suggest there may be deterioration in a holistic commitment to medicine in the United States. Reclaiming an integrated professional paradigm—wherein conscience, philanthropia, and vocation are combined—is essential to an authentic contemporary witness. (shrink)

In The Anticipatory Corpse, Jeffrey Bishop claims that modern medicine has lost formal and final causality as the dead body has become epistemologically normative, and that a singular focus on efficient and material causality has thoroughly distorted modern medical practice. Bishop implies that the renewal of medicine will require its housing in alternate social spaces. This essay critiques both Bishop’s diagnosis and therapy by arguing, first, that alternate social imaginaries, though perhaps marginalized, are already present within the practice of medicine. (...) And second, the essay argues that alternate social imaginaries in medicine can be reclaimed not through separatist communities but in the re-narration of conceptually underdetermined practices. Given Bishop’s invitation for theology to engage medicine, this essay then draws from theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer for the kind of diagnosis and therapy currently needed, concluding with a contemporary example of how an alternate social imaginary is being instantiated in modern medicine. (shrink)

In his 1917 lecture “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber challenged current and aspiring scholars to abandon any pretense that science bears within itself any meaning. In a disenchanted age, he argued, science could at best offer “knowledge of the techniques whereby we can control life... through calculation,” and any meaning or moral direction to scientific research—including religious meaning—must be imposed on it from without. Weber presciently anticipated that many present-day health care practitioners would struggle to find meaning for their (...) work within complex “state-capitalist” health care systems, along with predictable quasi-religious responses. But how are Christian practitioners to practice faithfully in a disenchanted age? The authors of this special issue lean deeply into the loci of Christian theology and Christian practice, some challenging the views of the body and of nature that informed Weber’s theory of disenchantment, and all offering resources and paths by which practitioners might “look the fate of the age full in the face” with courage and wisdom. (shrink)

Every day around the country, patients are discharged from hospitals without difficulty, as the interests of the hospital and the patient tend to align: both the hospital and the patient want the patient to leave and go to a setting that will promote the patient’s continued recovery. In some cases, however, this usually routine process does not go quite as smoothly. Patients may not want to leave the hospital, or they may insist on an unsafe discharge plan. In other cases, (...) there may simply be no good place for the patient to go. These complex hospital discharge situations often involve ethical, legal, financial, and practical considerations, but the ethical issues inherent in these dilemmas have received only sporadic attention from clinical ethicists at best, leaving patients, providers, administrators, and caregivers unsure about what to do. When the ethical issues are in fact brought to light, analysis usually proceeds based on a consideration of the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. However, principled analysis often fails to present patients and providers with a satisfactory solution, as the principles inevitably conflict. In this paper, I argue that difficult discharges are ethical dilemmas worthy of scholarly attention that goes beyond principlism, and I argue that providers and those involved in discharge planning ought to cultivate what philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre calls “virtues of acknowledged dependence” in order to care for these patients and their families. I first trace the current conversation about difficult discharge and show that the principled approach to resolving discharge dilemmas is not sufficient. I then argue that a new approach is needed, and to that end, I offer practical ways in which MacIntyre’s account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence may help patients, providers, and family members to navigate issues of difficult discharge. (shrink)

Empathy is sometimes so hard to achieve that one may wonder if it is a virtue for caregivers at all. Perhaps a caregiver cannot always know how a patient feels, and perhaps that knowledge is sometimes too painful to possess. A nuanced understanding of what empathy entails and of the conditions for attaining it can help ground its possibility.