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  1. The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Ted Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 1-46.
    My primary aim in this chapter is to explain in what the traditional mind–body problem consists, what its possible solutions are, and what obstacles lie in the way of a resolution. The discussion will develop in two phases. The first phase, sections 1.2–1.4, will be concerned to get clearer about the import of our initial question as a precondition of developing an account of possible responses to it. The second phase, sections 1.5–1.6, explains how a problem arises in our attempts (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem.L. F. Mucciolo - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):185-204.
    IntroductionThe identity thesis asserts that for every psychological state P there is a neural state N such that P=N. In the hope of rendering IT clear and plausible many identity theorists have compared psycho-neural identity claims to such theoretical identities as temperature is identical with molecular mean kinetic energy. However such a comparison admits a weak and a strong interpretation. According to the weak interpretation, psycho-neural identities are said to be like theoretical identities in the sense that the former are (...)
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  • The place of freedom in life: Some models of a human being.John A. Schumacher - 1980 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (4):345-377.
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  • Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis.Gordon G. Globus - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):291-301.
    Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. "Consciousness per se" and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the (unobserved) brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory (...)
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  • Reduction and abduction in chemistry‐a response to Scerri.Paul Needham - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):169 – 184.
    Eric Scerri has proposed an account of how reduction might be understood in chemistry. He claims to build on a general aspect of Popper's views which survives his otherwise heavy criticism, namely adherence to actual scientific practice. This is contrasted with Nagel's conception, which Scerri takes to be the philosopher's standard notion. I argue that his proposal, interesting though it is, is not so foreign to ideas in the tradition within which Nagel wrote as Scerri would have us believe. Moreover, (...)
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