Hindu texts call into question our own gender conceptions; they tell us that desire for bisexual pleasure and the wish to belong to both sexes at the same time are very real, but unrealizable, except by those with magic gifts. Many myths bear witness to the existential perception of human beings as bisexual and to active bisexual transformations. Some may show the desire to be androgynous and, contrary to the dominant homophobic paradigm, present veiled images of a bisexuality fulfilled in (...) happiness and satisfaction. The episode evoking Chudala as a mistress of initiation and some variants in the magical forests of Shiva and Parvati illustrate this carefree, joyous way of crossing the gender barrier. (shrink)

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal (...) an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, ‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’. (shrink)

Several Buddhist schools in India, China and Japan concentrate on the interrelationships between waking and dreaming consciousness. In Eastern philosophy, reality can be seen as a dream and an obscure 'reality beyond' can be considered as real. In spite of the overwhelming Platonic-Aristotelian-Freudian influence existent in Western culture, some Western thinkers and artists - Valéry, Baudelaire, and Schnitzler, for example - have been fascinated by a kind of 'simple presence' contained in dreams. I show that this has consequences for a (...) philosophy of space. According to the authors discussed, the dreamer and the player recognize that human space always means the entire cosmos. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in narrative both in certain areas of philosophy and in the study of religion. The philosophy of religion has not itself been at the forefront of this narrative turn, but exceptions exist—most notably Eleonore Stump’s work on biblical stories and the problem of suffering. Characterizing Stump’s approach as an apologetic orientation, this article contrasts it with pluralistic orientations that, rather than seeking to defend religious faith, are concerned with doing conceptual justice to the (...) range of possible human perspectives, both religious and nonreligious. By discussing various examples, the article makes a case for narrative philosophy of religion, especially in its pluralistic form. (shrink)

The ninth chapter of the Haṃsavilāsa of the Gujarati Śaiva author Haṃsamiṭṭhu (born 1738 ad) argues that Pātañjalayoga, conceived of as a conflation of Aṣṭāṅgayoga and Haṭhayoga, cannot be valid soteriology. Pātañjalayoga is presented as a paradoxical and painful attempt to achieve quiescence by forcibly eliminating karma. Haṃsamiṭṭhu, conversely, views ‘euphoria’ (ullāsa) as a prerequisite for liberation, and therefore advocates a painless method of Rājayoga. This is taught as a Śaiva form of the Rāsalīlā involving transgressive substances and behaviour. A (...) frame story establishes Haṃsamiṭṭhu’s authority to teach such practices by revealing his secret identity as Haṃsa, a favored companion of Śiva who incarnates for a single life to promulgate esoteric teachings. The purity of this Rāsalīlā is defended by challenging the validity of a conventional morality that seeks to portray it as abhorrent. (shrink)

The ninth chapter of the Haṃsavilāsa of the Gujarati Śaiva author Haṃsamiṭṭhu (born 1738 ad) argues that Pātañjalayoga, conceived of as a conflation of Aṣṭāṅgayoga and Haṭhayoga, cannot be valid soteriology. Pātañjalayoga is presented as a paradoxical and painful attempt to achieve quiescence by forcibly eliminating karma. Haṃsamiṭṭhu, conversely, views ‘euphoria’ (ullāsa) as a prerequisite for liberation, and therefore advocates a painless method of Rājayoga. This is taught as a Śaiva form of the Rāsalīlā involving transgressive substances and behaviour. A (...) frame story establishes Haṃsamiṭṭhu’s authority to teach such practices by revealing his secret identity as Haṃsa, a favored companion of Śiva who incarnates for a single life to promulgate esoteric teachings. The purity of this Rāsalīlā is defended by challenging the validity of a conventional morality that seeks to portray it as abhorrent. (shrink)